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In its narrowest focus this article asks questions as to the likely out-
come of two cases currently before the Supreme Court, which may well
be decided before this is read. The subject of these two cases-affirma-
tive action-has been highly controversial and has found the Court often
hesitant and indecisive. En route to considering the predictabilty of re-
sults in these cases-quite a different question from my perception of
desirability-I shall directly confront that past indecisiveness, and ask
why. Many others have done this. In its brief history affirmative action
had drawn unusual attention from academic lawyers, philosophers, and
moralists. My interest is in the Supreme Court, and how it goes about
deciding such cases where the body politic is divided. The answer sug-
gested here I designate-following distinguished commentators who
served on the Court-as "constitutional politics."'
Deeply instilled in the legal profession is the cherished notion that
everything surrounding the Constitution, including its interpretation,
is-or should be-ordered by "law." Of course, the widest differences
exist among academic lawyers writing in the constitutional field as to
what this "law" of interpretation should be. Nevertheless, I have been
warned by eminent members of this fraternity/sorority that description
of the interpretative function of the Supreme Court as "constitutional
politics" will be widely (and perhaps deliberately) misunderstood. As a
minimum, they suggest, I should warn up front just what I intend by
''constitutional politics." Fair enough.
What I do not mean, of course, is partisan politics. What I do try to
develop in the course of this article is that beyond this exclusion, the
politics of constitutional interpretation has included such a wide range as
nation-states politics, separation- of-national-powers politics, race poli-
tics, sex politics, fair-trial politics, extension- of-the-franchise politics,
economic-theory politics, consensus politics, and fairness politics-yes,
and affirmative action politics (which combines many of these).
A.B. 1937, Princeton University; LL.B. 1941, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University; D. Phil.
1968, Oxford University; Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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No one of these accounts for the variety of conflicting interpretations
by the Supreme Court across its history. Consensus politics might ex-
plain the Court's sex decisions down to the 1970's, and its race decisions
down to 1954. But in no way can it account for the unpopular criminal
justice decisions of the 1960's, or the often minority-friendly decisions in
the Brown era, following 1954.2 Nor has it been established to general
satisfaction that any of these sets of decisions is clearly rooted either in
constitutional text or in demonstrable framers' intent. It is already evi-
dent that it is no part of the constitutional politics thesis developed here
that the "politics" used by a particular Supreme Court in pronouncing
"constitutional law" is either good or bad Nor does the thesis consider
the question whether there is, or is not, a better way to run our constitu-
tional system. The constitutional politics thesis is purely descriptive.
Evaluation of the performance of the Court-the Court of today, or
across its 200-year history-is the next step, saved for another day.
Last Term the Supreme Court heard and decided three affirmative ac-
tion cases.' The central question in these cases was-let's face it-
whether affirmative action had a future. The United States Department
of Justice had mounted a relentless attack on any racial preference in an
employment program that did not benefit a specific victim of identified
racial discrimination. This campaign was fueled by some language in the
majority opinion in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts4 in 1984,
and the Solicitor General entered the three 1986 affirmative action cases
on behalf of the United States to persuade the Supreme Court to adminis-
ter. the final lethal blow.
In the first of these 1985 Term decisions, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,5 the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals which had approved a provision of an affirmative action plan a
union had negotiated with a public school board. Since the provision in
question resulted in failure to recall from layoff a more senior white
teacher, and there had been no findings of past discrimination that met
previous standards set by the Court, the Wygant reversal was neither
unexpected, nor especially damaging, in fact quite the opposite. In the
opinions reversing the Sixth Circuit, a majority of the Court used lan-
guage that seemed to reaffirm the availability of an affirmative action
2. The Court was well aware that it was moving in advance of majority opinion-certainly in
the south-when it issued its unanimous opinion in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS (1939-1975), THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
113-15 (1980). A similar point can be made for the criminal justice decisions of the Warren era. See
infra text accompanying notes 88-93.
3. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, v. City of
Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
4. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
5. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
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plan under title VII as a remedy for past racial discrimination, even as to
persons who were not themselves "specific victims" of the identified ra-
cial discrimination.
In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v.
EEOC6 and Local Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland,7 the Supreme Court made clear, even if by narrow
margins, that it rejected the current Department of Justice position on
affirmative action. In Sheet Metal Workers, as eight years earlier in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke,' Justice Powell's opinion
was controlling. The Court divided 5-4 in upholding under title VII the
court-ordered affirmative action plan in face of egregious past discrimina-
tion. According to Justice Powell, neither the Stotts decision, nor any bar
from title VII or the equal protection clause, prevented the district court
from establishing an affirmative action plan that benefited non-victims in
the circumstances shown there.9
In Local Number 9310 the Court, this time by a 6-3 vote, rejected a
second contention that the Department of Justice claimed was implicit in
Stotts: that a consent decree could not embody relief beyond that which a
district court could order after full trial of a case. The Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Brennan, found that the underlying policy of title VII in
favor of voluntary settlement negated this contention.11 However, the
6. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3054 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Marshall J.,
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J.), 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
7. Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077.(Justice Brennan's opinion of the Court was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor.)
8. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In this case a majority of the
Justices spoke for the first time on the question whether an affirmative racial preference could be
constitutional under the equal protection clause. Justice Powell maintained that a strict "compelling
state interest" test must be met to justify use of such a "benign" discrimination, and illustrated
situations which could satisfy the test. Justice Brennan (joined by Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun) would have subjected a racial preference to a less demanding constitutional test. Most
courts of appeal accepted the Powell opinion, the highest common denominator of a majority of the
Court, as controlling, pending further word from the Supreme Court. The Court's cautious approach
in Bakke to the question of the constitutionality of affirmative action was underscored by the fact
that four Justices did not deal with the constitutional issue. Of the Court majority which directed
Bakke's admission to Davis Medical School, affirming the judgment of the California Supreme
Court, only Justice Powell reached the equal protection issue. The other four Justices relied solely on
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
9. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3055:
The finding by the District Court... that petitioners have engaged in egregious violations of
Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] establishes, without doubt, a compelling governmen-
tal interest sufficient to justify the imposition of a racially classified remedy .... My inquiry,
therefore, focuses on whether the District Court's remedy is 'narrowly tailored'.. .to the goal of
eradicating the discrimination engaged in by petitioners. I believe it is.
Id.
10. Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
11. The Court acknowledged that a consent decree was at the same time a judicial order and a
voluntary agreement as to the relief embodied therein. However, the predominant note of a consent
decree was its voluntary element. Id. at 3072. Hence, it was not to be tested by the same standards
3
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Court did not pass on the appropriateness of the affirmative relief made
available in Local Number 93, either as to hiring or promotions, and re-
manded the case for the district court's reconsideration.
Within ten days of the decisions in Sheet Metal Workers and Local
Number 93 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two affirmative ac-
tion cases which had been on its docket for over six months: United
States v. Paradise,'" and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, California.3 These two cases raise questions about affirmative
action which the Court did not address in its carefully qualified opinions
in the 1985 Term cases. This article will consider these two cases now
before the Court in light of Wygant-Sheet Metal Workers-Local Number
93, the earlier affirmative action cases in the Court,14 and contemporary
Supreme Court process. The design will be to accentuate the elements of
this process that shed light on the likely resolution by the Court of the
1986 Term cases (Johnson and Paradise), and consequently on the imme-
diate future of affirmative action.
I. THE THESIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
In the memorable posthumous study, The Supreme Court in the Ameri-
can System of Government, 5 Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson
referred to the Supreme Court "as a political institution arbitrating the
allocation of powers between different branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, between state and nation, between state and state, and between
majority government and minority rights."' 6 Justice Benjamin Cardozo
anticipated Jackson's point after serving eighteen years on New York's
under title VII (§ 706(g)) as a non-voluntary judicial order. The Court did not pass on the appropri-
ateness of the affirmative relief made available in Local Number 93. It simply held that "whether or
not 706(g) precludes a court from imposing certain forms of race-conscious relief after trial, that
provision does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree." Id. Justice O'Connor underscored in
her concurring opinion that "The Court leaves open the question whether the race-conscious meas-
ures provided for in the consent decree at issue here were permissible," whether under title VII or
equal protection. Id. at 3080 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (1 lth Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub noma. United States v.
Paradise, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
13. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
14. Notably, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
Broderick, Affirmative Action After Stotts: The United States Supreme Court's 1985 Term, 15 N.C.
CENT. LJ. 145, 186-89 (1985), reports a sampling of the affirmative action literature up to 1985.
Three subsequent articles of interest are Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engi-
neers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986) (against affirmative action); Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust:
A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986) (for affirmative action);
and Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination; Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 78
(1986) (a brief evaluative report on Wygant-Sheet Metal Workers-Local Number 93).
15. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (1955).
16. Id. at 9.
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highest court and ascending to the United States Supreme Court: "it [the
New York Court of Appeals] is a great common law court; its problems
are lawyers' problems. But the Supreme Court is occupied chiefly with
statutory construction... and with politics."' 7 Justice Jackson, in recal-
ling Cardozo's comment, stressed that "he used politics in no sense of
partisanship but in the sense of policy-making. His remarks point to
some features of the federal judicial power which distinguish it from the
functions of the usual law court."18
In twenty years of teaching constitutional law to second year law stu-
dents, I have stressed that there are significant differences between the
private law courses they studied in their first year and the study of consti-
tutional law. On rereading Jackson and Cardozo I propose that the
Supreme Court's approach to interpretation of the Constitution is not
merely "significantly" different than the judicial process of common law
judges, but in major areas "totally" different.' 9 This modest overstate-
ment is more defensible than encouraging the unbelievable dogma that
"law" is "law," and that "constitutional law" is merely a slightly "tuned
up" variety. In this section I hope to make the case (with Justices Jack-
son and Cardozo) that when we consider how the Supreme Court inter-
prets the Constitution the subject at hand is "Constitutional Politics."*
In presenting this thesis of "Constitutional Politics" my aim is modest
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id.
19. From time to time in the course of this article I shall make reference to "the Academy." In
general, the term "Academy" refers to scholars writing in various fields of scholarship. Ordinarily in
Anglo-American law "the Academy" connotes those academic lawyers who occupy themselves with
general legal theory. A constitutional scholar understands the doctrine of judicial review to refer to a
court's (notably the Supreme Court's) power to nullify a statute or other governmental act that it
sees as in conflict with a provision of the Constitution-a doctrine that has been in place since
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), see infra text accompanying notes 23-30. There
is a kinship between general legal theory, especially that part dealing with judicial decision-making,
and the doctrine of judicial review in constitutional law. But there is an obvious difference. Whereas
judge-made case law in areas of general law can be overridden by the legislature, the consequences of
judicial review in constitutional law are ordinarily not subject to such easy reversal by democratic
process. Furthermore, the still dominant general legal theory in American law, is legal positivism-
particularly the moderated positivism of the English academic lawyer, H.L.A. Hart. Hart insists that
the central thesis of legal positivism is "that there is no necessary connexion between law and
morals, or law as it is and law as it ought to be." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 203 (1961).
Yet Hart expresses significant reservations as to the application of his general theory to the Ameri-
can constitutional system: "In some systems, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal
validity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive moral values .... Judicial decision,
especially on matters of high constitutional import, often involves a choice between moral values,
and not merely the application of some single outstanding moral principle .. " Id. at 199-200.
Those academic lawyers who have been content to approach non-constitutional case law, and consti-
tutional decision-making, with the same general theory of law, have understandably sown confusion.
These include such eminent legal theorists as Karl Llewellyn, the paradigm of Legal Realists, see
infra note 406, and Ronald Dworkin, who has almost single-handedly injected new life into contem-
porary American jurisprudence, see infra note 424. For these reasons, when I speak of "the Acad-
emy" in this article I shall generally concentrate on scholars who treat constitutional law-making as
a special case. See infra notes 404 and 414.
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and descriptive, not judgmental. I neither defend nor attack here partic-
ular results the Court has reached. I insist merely that the most impor-
tant work of the Supreme Court throughout its history has been to decide
"political questions in legal form.""0 The "Constitutional Politics" thesis
serves to explain, rather than to justify, to lay citizens and law students
as well as lawyers, the mixed track record of the Court. It also provides a
necessary first step for lawyers and clients, and lower court judges as
well, to predict how the Supreme Court is apt to rule in cases it under-
takes to decide. In our present context, this has particular application to
the affirmative action cases the Court has docketed for the current 1986
Term. In short, without understanding the reality and the legitimacy of
"politics"2 in Supreme Court process there is small hope of rescue from
scepticism and disillusionment, and no answer to much of the nonsense
currently promulgated as constructive criticism of the Supreme Court's
supposed "departure" from traditional judicial norms by a flurry of "ac-
tivist" decision-making.22
In support of the "Politics" thesis I shall recall four major and familiar
lines of decisions that are inexplicable on any principle other than the
changing politics of the Supreme Court. The first deals with the Supreme
Court's early assertion of its primacy and finality in interpreting the Con-
stitution in relation to the Congress and the Executive, the other two
federal centers of power established by the Constitution. The second con-
cerns the Court's marking of the constitutional boundaries between fed-
eral and state power. One can hardly conceive of questions more political
than these. The third and fourth areas of my present inquiry deal with
collisions between individual rights and governmental power (federal or
state) in interpretation of the due process and the equal protection ele-
20. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 55.
21. The term "constitutional politics" has been used in recent legal scholarship, but generally
with a different signification than Jackson's, Cardozo's, and mine in this article. For example, Bruce
Ackerman speaks of "constitutional politics" as direct action by "the people" when they rise up (as
it were) and speak out decisively on a matter of supreme national importance. His chief example is
the New Deal's overthrow of the Court's laissez-faire constitutionalism. Ackerman, The Storrs Lec-
tures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1053 (1984).
In responding to Laurence Tribe's criticism of his theory of the Supreme Court's role in the consti-
tutional amendment process, Walter Dellinger speaks somewhat derisively of "constitutional poli-
tics". He constrasts it with "constitutional law," which is the proper business of the courts.
Dellinger, Constitutional Politics: A Rejoinder, 97 HARV. L. REV. 446, 448-49 (1983). Frank
Michelman comes closer to what Jackson and Cardozo intended by "constitutional politics" when
he concludes his most recent article by referring to the Supreme Court as a collegial arena of "dia-
logue" for "the politics of law." Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 65 (1986). In note 225 infra I consider the use of the term "jurisprudential politics" by the
French academic lawyer, Maurice Hauriou, in a sense close to "constitutional politics" as discussed
in this article.
22. See, e.g., infra notes 404 and 409, which summarize recent attacks on the Supreme Court
and the American law schools by Attorney General Edwin Meese, and Assistant Attorney General
William Bradford Reynolds.
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ments of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Whereas the first two
deal directly with competing claims of governmental bodies, these last
two confrontations find the Court struggling with questions no less polit-
ical, the majoritarian claims of governmental power and the counter-
majoritarian assertions of express or implied limitations upon the exer-
cise of governmental power.
1. The Supreme Court's Assertion of Its Primacy As Interpreter of
the Constitution-Marbury v. Madison (1803)23
So persuasive was Chief Justice Marshall's defense of the inevitability
of the doctrine of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison in 180324 that
much constitutional literature accepts it as an undeniable and inevitable
aspect of the "judicial power of the United States" which was vested in
the Supreme Court by article III of the Constitution.25 According to
Marshall the doctrine of judicial review requires a federal court in decid-
ing a particular case to measure a challenged governmental act or statute
against the Constitution and refuse to enforce it if, in the court's view,
the act or statute is contrary to the Constitution.26 No matter that the
Congress which passed the federal statute in dispute in Marbury was
composed of many members who had framed the Constitution, and that
this Congress had concluded that the statute was valid. Marshall stated
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is,"" and by "law" Marshall "emphatically" included
the meaning of the constitutional language and whether a governmental
act trespassed upon the Supreme Court's construction of a relevant pas-
sage of the Constitution.
Neither the express constitutional language ("judicial power of the
United States") nor the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
(which did not become available until 1840)28 required this broad asser-
tion of judicial supremacy. Truly, this bold assertion in Marbury, the
Supreme Court's earliest major adventure in political decision-making,
however plausible, was a blow struck in its own behalf. Despite the estab-
lishment by the Constitution of three separate governmental powers
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. Id. at 178.
25. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1.
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177-78.
27. Id. at 177.
28. "The framers' agreement not to publicize the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention
for 50 years-a silence broken only in 1840 with the appearance of James Madison's journals-
guaranteed that the crucial earliest discussions of their handiwork would be handicapped by the
inaccessibility of the context and intention of the Philadelphia debates." Kennedy, Book Review,
The N. Y. Times Book Rev., Sept. 14, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
7
Broderick: Constitutional Politics: Affirmative Action and Supreme Process
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1987
92 NOR TH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
without any statement of preeminence among them, the Court in Mar-
bury set in motion a precedent of enduring political significance, which it
has since reinforced.2 9 Not until the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford3 °
decision in 1856 did the Supreme Court declare another act of Congress
unconstitutional. However, the foundation stone was laid in Marbury for
the extensive use by the Supreme Court in its second century of its doc-
trine of judicial review to declare acts of federal and state governments
unconstitutional.
2. National Legislative Powers vs State "Police Power": The
Eventual Predominance of Another Major Political
Decision of Chief Justice Marshall
In article I, section 8 the Constitution enumerates the legislative pow-
ers allocated to Congress. These did not include the power to establish
corporations, or a national bank. However, in McCulloch v. Maryland31
another landmark opinion, Chief Justice Marshall upheld Congress' cre-
ation of the second Bank of the United States. Marshall stated that in
addition to its specifically enumerated powers Congress constitutionally
"might employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would most advan-
tageously effect the object to be accomplished" 3 (i.e. as set out in a
power enumerated in article I, section 8).3
The post-Marshall Supreme Courts swung constitutional policy to-
wards favoring states exercise of their legislative power (called the "po-
lice power') 34 in face of the broad allocation to Congress of power to
regulate commerce among the several states. Congress did not enact sig-
nificant national economic statutes until the Interstate Commerce Act3"
in 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act36 in 1890. From 1895 to 1937,
with certain exceptions, the Supreme Court trimmed down congressional
exercise of the "commerce power." For example, the Court excluded na-
tional regulation of enterprises engaged in manufacturing and mining.
29. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see infra
note 377.
30. 56 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
32. Id. at 419.
33. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
34. The term "police power" embraced state legislation to regulate in areas of health, safety,
welfare and morals. In the mid-19th century years the "police power" of the states was used as a
counterfoil to the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress under article I, section 8. See infra
text accompanying notes 374-75 for Justice Jackson's comment on this development.
35. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
36. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
37. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918); and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), exemplify this development.
8
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The weight of the Supreme Court of this period was thrown against na-
tional regulation in favor of permitting such enterprises to be regulated, if
at all, by the states. Far distant from the broad national theme of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland a" was this substitution of ju-
dicial for congressional judgment as to the "appropriate" scope of the
commerce clause, and the Court's citation of the tenth amendment 9 as
an express constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of its
specified legislative powers. This political turn of the Supreme Court ulti-
mately led to its face-to-face confrontation with the unprecedented na-
tional program of regulation enacted by the Roosevelt-dominated
Congresses of 1933-1936.
The so-called Roosevelt "court-packing" plan of 193740 was directed
at the "political" shift of the Supreme Court away from the Marshall
view of broad congressional legislative power. Although the Roosevelt
proposal to add members to the Supreme Court failed, beginning in 1937
the Supreme Court made still another "political" change of direction.
The early Marshall measure of national legislative power was reinstated.
In a series of cases culminating in two decisions upholding the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 1938"' and the second Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1936,42 reinforced by two decisions upholding (on commerce
clause grounds) the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 3 the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the minimal "rational basis" standard of review in passing on the
constitutionality of congressional enactments under the commerce
clause.'
Oddly enough, even the pre-Roosevelt Court with all its hostility to
38. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
39. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.CONST. AMEND. X.
40. On February 5, 1937, at the beginning of the second month of his second term (which he
had won with the loss of but two states) President Roosevelt sent a proposed bill to Congress which,
if passed, would have permitted him to name up to six additional members of the Supreme Court. S.
Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary-Adverse Re-
port of the Committee on the Judiciary). See infra note 394.
41. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
42. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11 (1942).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
44. Since the advent of the Roosevelt Court (see infra note 76), the Supreme Court has sought
to repel any suggestion that it merely substitutes its judgment for that of a legislature by using an
carefully orchestrated system of graduated interest analysis.
A unanimous opinion of Justice Marshall in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), attests the continued viability of this standard:
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate com-
merce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). This
established, the only remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether 'the means chosen by
[Congress] must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' The judicial
task is at an end once the court determines that Congress acted rationally in adopting a particu-
lar regulatory scheme.
9
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congressional regulatory legislation, upheld in the broadest possible
terms Congress' power under article I, section 8 to pass taxing and
spending legislation "for the general welfare," with minimal judicial re-
view as to Congress' determination of what constituted the "general wel-
fare."45 The "political" decision of the Court to forego judicial oversight
of Congress' power under the "taxing and spending" clause has been al-
most total in the half century since the United States v. Butler46 case.
Two separate "political" turnarounds by the Burger Court with re-
spect to, Congress' legislative power to regulate states in their functions as
states have cancelled each other out, leaving congressional power seem-
ingly as broad in regulating state activities as in regulating private activi-
ties under the commerce power.47
The current Supreme Court, with the sole exception of the "states as
Id. at 276.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), Justice White summarized
the current state of the catalog of equal protection formulas in delivering the opinion of the Court:
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classifica-
tion drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest .... The general rule
gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors
are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy- a view that those in the
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such
discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to
strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.
Id. at 3254-55. The opinion goes on to point out that the Court has developed intermediate tests for
gender, see infra notes 165-68, and illegitimacy, but see infra note 149, and declined to do so for
discrimination based on age, or on mental retardation (a conclusion of Cleburne itself). Id. at 3255-
58. The Court's determination of which test is appropriate for a particular form of discrimination is,
of course, crucial for purposes of judicial review.
45. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
46. In Butler the Court stated that "the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public
moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution." Id. at 66. In a controlling opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980),
Chief Justice Burger upheld a racial preference set-aside under the spending power. See infra text
accompanying notes 260-66. However, he declined to "explore the outermost limitations on the
objectives attainable [by] the Spending Power," observing that its reach was "at least as broad as the
regulatory powers of Congress," and that these furnished ample basis to sustain the program. Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. at 475.
47. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In the earliest of these
cases the Court upheld application of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state
functions. In the second the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, limiting the effect of Congressional
legislation which bore upon the "states as states" so as to burden the exercise of their governmental
functions. Then, only nine years later, the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia. The
current deep political differences on the Court with respect to the federal-state power allocation are
made unmistakably clear in the vituperative Garcia opinions, which underscore the traditionally
fragile adherence of the Court to stare decisis in constitutional decisions. Justice Powell's dissent
merely complains that "The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of this
Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this
case." Garcia 105 S. Ct. at 1022. However Justice Rehnquist's dissent seems to forecast and justify
further departure from stare decisis: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
10
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states" question,48 has been in agreement on the practical acceptance of
the John Marshall test of expansive congressional power. The Court has
implemented this political decision by embodying it in a minimal "ra-
tional basis" test49 for measuring the constitutionality of congressional
legislation. The result, following the Court's post-1937 work habits, is
embodied in a Court-created formula of "law." But the legal formula
merely conveys the Court's political decision that the Constitution "re-
quires" the recognition that close judicial oversight is not feasible with
respect to measures passed by the deliberative bodies of the United States
Congress in which all fifty states are represented. However, the equal
protection clause may open up other possibilities for judicial review5°
even in economic matters. And when individual personal rights are in
contest even congressional legislation will be more carefully scrutinized
by the Court, as the next two sections will attest. Here too, the Court's
political choices, much contested by some, dictate and underlie the
Supreme Court's constitutional decisions.
3. Constitutional Limitations of Governmental Power # 1: The
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments
The constitutional injunction that "No person shall... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"5 1 entered the Amer-
ican Constitution as an element of the multi-faceted fifth amendment,
one of the ten amendments adopted as a package in 1791 and known
collectively as the Bill of Rights. In 1833 a unanimous Supreme Court
held that the last phrase of the fifth amendment "nor shall private prop-
further the fine points of a [federalism] principle that will, I am confident, in time again command
the support of a majority of the Court." Id. at 1033.
Dean Wellington has written that "The doctrine of stare decisis is not strong in the constitutional
realm." Wellington, History and Morals in Constitutional Adjudication, 97 HARV. L. REV. 326, 335
(1983). Subsequent action, and comment, by the Court (including Garcia, and Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Haldeman, 105 S. Ct 900 (1984)) suggests that Wellington has understated the
case. Justice Brandeis' account of the role of stare decisis in constitutional decision in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), has become classic:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right .... This is commonly true even
wher the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be made by legislation.
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.
See also Justice Douglas' confirming update: Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735
(1949)(listing over thirty cases that had been overruled from 1937-49.)
From all of this we may conclude that while the Court values stability of decisions and decisional
coherence, the Justices show little patience with the "conserving" (stand pat) dimension of the stare
decisis doctrine when they consider that significant "political" issues are at stake.
48. See supra text accompanying note 47.
49. See supra note 44.
50. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 469 U.S. 810 (1984).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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erty be taken for public use, without just compensation" was "intended
solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the
United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states." '
This Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, decision entailed that the entire Bill
of Rights, including the due process clause, did not limit state action.
The conclusion was not obvious; other courts had held the Bill of Rights
generally applicable to the states. The usually nationalistic Chief Justice
Marshall, again decided an important political question. But this time in
the Nullification atmosphere of the 1830's his opinion for the Court left
the states free from restraints written to favor individuals against undue
exercise of governmental power.
The Supreme Court did not suggest what process was "due" from the
national government until 1855. Its first definition of the content of "due
process of law" in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.," was both rigid and modest. "Due process" was to be measured by
(1) the express terms of the Constitution itself, notably those listed else-
where in the Bill of Rights, and (2) "old process"-"those settled usages
and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of Eng-
land before the immigration of our ancestors," provided they are not
"unsuited" to the needs of the new constitutional democracy.54
In 1868, shortly after the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was
added to the Constitution, expressly providing that "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." The Supreme Court was slow to identify the content of fourteenth
amendment "due process," which was couched in the exact same lan-
guage of the fifth amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases55 in 1873,
the due process clause was pressed as making unconstitutional a Louisi-
ana law which established a monopoly of butchering in New Orleans.
The defendant urged that this law infringed on his "property" right or
"liberty" to pursue a trade. The Supreme Court abruptly rejected this
contention:
[I]t is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision ["due
process"] that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can
[this] restraint.. .be held to be a deprivation of property within the mean-
ing of that provision.
56
Four years later the Court suggested a hardly more helpful formulation
of due process: "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,
as the cases presented for decision shall require."'5 7 By the turn of the
52. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
53. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
54. Id. at 277.
55. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
56. Id. at 80-81.
57. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
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century the Supreme Court had made a significant retreat, or political
adjustment, from its earlier reluctance (in Slaughter-House and suc-
ceeding cases)5" to view property and contract rights as protected by the
fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses against federal and
state action. The words "due process" were unchanged. Yet the Court
took a 180 degree turn as to the substantial protection they afforded indi-
viduals against governmental action affecting property and contract in-
terests. Such cases as Allgeyer v. Louisiana59 and Lochner v. New York,'
and a procession of cases down to 1937,61 could only be explained as a
political change of direction by the Supreme Court.
Over this same period between the end of the Civil War and the early
decades of this century the Supreme Court showed little interest in pro-
tecting individual rights by use of the due process clause beyond the eco-
nomic context (property and contract). In 1884, in Hurtado v.
California ,62 the Supreme Court did throw off the rigid historical formu-
lation of due process which it had specified in Murray.63 The basic con-
stitutional guarantees of due process, said Justice Mathews for the Court,
do not merely consecrate "particular forms of procedure" (as Murray
had suggested); "they constitute the very substance of individual rights to
life, liberty and property." 4 Hurtado recognized a new scope for the
Supreme Court in identifying new constitutional rights as elements of
due process. The scope was wide, but the criteria for identifying such
rights were loose: history, comparative law, natural law (in the sense of
"justice- suum cuique tribuere"),65 and the learning of experience.66
The Court's search for the content of due process Was to be for "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice."67 In Hurtado the Court, apply-
ing this test, held that California had stayed within constitutional limits
in failing to furnish Hurtado with indictment by grand jury, because this
right, although it was specified in the fifth amendment, was not
"fundamental." '68
58. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill
U.S. 746 (1884); Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
59. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. Among the most frequently cited cases in this procession are New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1927); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan,
264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S.
590 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 1 (1908).
62. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54
64. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532.
65. "To give to each his own." Id. at 531.
66. Id..
67. Id. at 535.
68. Id. at 538.
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In Twining v. New Jersey in 1908,69 a state prosecutor's comment on a
defendant's exercise of his privilege not to testify was held not to violate
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because it was not a
"fundamental right," hence not a violation of "due process."7 In Palko
v. Connecticut in 1937,71 the defendant was indicted for first degree mur-
der, but was convicted of second degree murder.72 Therefore, instead of
the death penalty, the defendant received a life sentence. The state ap-
pealed the sentence and won a new trial which resulted in a first degree
murder conviction and the death penalty. Palko appealed, claiming
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy was explicitly proscribed by the fifth
amendment with respect to the federal government.73 Palko claimed that
it was a "fundamental right" entitled to protection against state action by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. When the case
reached the Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo wrote the Court's opinion
denying Palko's claim. The due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, he said, protects only rights that are "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty."' 74 He saw no such right in Palko's claim.
"There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice still stands, in
its symmetry, to many greater than before."' 75 This exacting test pre-
vailed through the Roosevelt Court's extensive turnover of Justices.7 6
In the 1947 decision of Adamson v. California7 7 the Court reconsid-
ered the question earlier disposed of in Twining,78the prosecutor's com-
ment as an alleged violation of a defendant's due process rights. Once
again the Court turned it aside, citing Twining and Cardozo's "scheme of
ordered liberty" test.79 This time four Justices dissented, led by Justice
Black. They would flatly overrule Twining and accept as their rationale
the contention made by the first Justice Harlan in his dissent in that
69. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
70. Id. at 110. The Court flatly said that the privilege against self-incrimination was not a
"fundamental" right. The opinion assumed, at first, that the facts (prosecutor's comment on defend-
ant's declining to take the stand) constituted a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination (if
it had been applicable to the states). Later in the opinion the Court squarely stated that such a
prosecutor's comment was not "an infringement of the privilege [against] self-incrimination." Id. at
114.
71. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
72. Id. at 322.
73. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb;..." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
75. Id. at 328.
76. From 1937 to 1943 President Roosevelt appointed eight new Supreme Court Justices, and
promoted Justice Stone to Chief Justice: Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy,
Byrnes, Jackson, and Rutledge.
77. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
78. Twining, 211 U.S. at 114.
79. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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case:80 that the fourteenth amendment due process clause was designed
by the Framers of that amendment to incorporate the first eight amend-
ments, and apply them against the states. Justice Black's dissent excori-
ated both the Twining standard of "fundamental rights,"' and the Palko
embroidery of a "scheme of ordered liberty."
8 s2
For the next two decades the Court engaged in a bitter "classic de-
bate." 3 When the smoke cleared Justice Black's total incorporation the-
ory had not prevailed, nor had Justice Cardozo's "scheme of ordered
liberty" test been discarded. But on a case by case basis every particular
element of the first eight amendments, except two,84 has been applied to
the States by the Court as ingredients of fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess. The "classic debate" was vituperative. One side claimed to rest on
an objective resort to history (Black's claim), 5 in contrast with subjec-
tive judicial decision (Black's charge against his adversaries).8 6 Accord-
ing to Justice Black, rights were so because the Framers of the fourteenth
amendment had made them so, and they were, therefore, not subject to
being chipped away by ad hoc political instincts of the Justices. Justice
Frankfurter, leading the opposition, challenged Justice Black's history, 7
80. Twining, 211 U.S. at 114. Justice Harlan made the same point in his dissent in Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900).
81. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 84.
82. Id. at 85-86.
83. This was Justice Brennan's phrase. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960).
84. The two exceptions are: the civil jury requirement of the seventh amendment, and the grand
jury requirement of the fifth amendment. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
85. Justice Black added an elaborate thirty-two page historical appendix to his Adamson dis-
sent. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 92-123.
86. To Justices Black and Douglas the objectivity and detachment claimed by their adversaries
was an illusion: "[E]motion rather than reason dictates the answers." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 506 (1960)(Douglas, J., dissenting). "There is a strong emotional appeal in the words 'fair play,'
'justice' and 'reasonableness'. But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution
or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or
Federal laws passed by elected representatives." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 325 (1945)(Black, J., concurring). "Due process under the prevailing doctrine is what the
judges say it is; and it differs from judge to judge." Hannah, 363 U.S. at 505 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
In Adamson, Justice Black denounced " 'the natural law' theory of the Constitution upon which [the
majority opinion] relies." Adamson, 332 U.S. at 70. In Hannah, writing for Justice Black and him-
self, Justice Douglas denounced the prevailing majority view as a "chameleon-like", "free-wheeling
concept of due process," which "turns on the personal predilections of the judge." Hannah, 363 U.S.
at 506. Due process had become "a tool of the activists who respond to their own visceral reactions
in deciding what is fair, decent or reasonable." Id. at 505 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
87. Justice Frankfurter, often in company with Justices Burton, Clark, Harlan and Reed, con-
tinued to insist on various guides to objectivity in the Court's due process decisions: History (Due
process "is itself an historical product" in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J.); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959)); a community "sense of justice," ("Due
process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction.. .but by that whole community sense
of 'decency and fairness'," in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957) (Clark, J.)); and "a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science .. " Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (1952). This
objectivity was insured by the very nature of the Supreme Court, "a tribunal disciplined for the task
and environed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment." Bartkus, 359 U.S. at
128 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.). Curiously Justice Frankfurter coupled these claims of objectivity with
15
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and defended the objectivity of decision according to the Twining-Palko
tests.
In his 1954 study,88 written almost midway in this debate, Justice
Jackson (who was invariably aligned with Frankfurter against the Black-
led "total incorporationists"), frankly avowed that high-level politics was
at stake:
[W]e must bear in mind that in the protection of individual or minority
rights, we are often impinging on the principle of majority rule. ... In
case after case in which so-called civil rights are involved, the question
simmers down to one of the extent to which majority rule will be set
aside. 90
Earlier in his book Justice Jackson made even clearer his impatience with
the "rights explosion":
Today [the fourteenth amendment] is being used not to restrain state leg-
islatures but to set aside the acts of state courts, particularly in criminal
matters.... I believe we are unjustifiably invading the rights of the states
by expanding the constitutional concept of due process to include the
idea that the error of a trial court deprives it of 'jurisdiction,' by includ-
ing in the concept by interpretation all other constitutional provisions not
literally incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in the alterna-
tive, by incorporating into it all our ideas of decency, even to the point of
making a constitutional issue of rulings upon evidence.
91
While affirming that the Supreme Court's decisions were political, Justice
Jackson was denying that, in this instance, they were "good" politics. At
least they were not his politics.
The almost total course of "selective incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights into fourteenth amendment due process was completed by 1969.
The final case, Benton v. Maryland,92 in the last year of the Warren
Court, held that the fifth amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy
applied to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, and that
"insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut is
overruled." 93
Just as two terms of President Eisenhower served to preserve and insti-
tutionalize the Roosevelt New Deal, sixteen years of the Burger Court
insistence upon the evolving aspect of due process ("due process does not preclude new ends of
government or new means for achieving them." Hannah, 363 U.S. at 493). He claimed also that
"the manifold variety and perplexity of the tasks" of other branches of government and of the states
weighed against "a doctrinaire conception" of due process Id. at 487. Further, this "disinterested"
Court had need to strike "the balance of individual hurt and justifying public good," id., and to
recognize that "what is unfair in one situation may be fair in another .... Id.
88. R. JACKSON, supra note 15.
89. Id. at 76.
90. Id. at 77.
91. Id. at 69-70.
92. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
93. Id. at 794.
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seemed to enshrine the basic judicial politics of the Warren years. How-
ever, in nibbling around the edges of particular rights,94 there was (and
is) ample room for stilling, if not actually reversing, the development of
these rights through restrictive interpretation. This is politics at retail
rather than wholesale, but politics nonetheless.
94. One of the most controversial decisions of the Warren Court was Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), which held that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment forbids the
prosecution to make use of the confession or admissions of a person in custody as an ingredient of his
conviction of a crime unless he had been advised of certain constitutional rights prior to being ques-
tioned: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make.may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attoiney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444.
As early as 1971 the Court, under Chief Justice Burger, commenced making inroads. In Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court held that the prosecution could use statements taken in
violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes on cross-examination of a defendant who elected to
take the stand. A procession of lesser intrusions (e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)), culminated in a major setback to Miranda in New York
v: Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles the Court made an express exception to Miranda for "a
situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety." Id. at 656. Then, in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court dropped another shoe,
still insisting that "The Court today in no way retreats from the bright line rule of Miranda." Id. at
317. In Elstad the police first received a confession from a suspect in custody, without giving the
Miranda warnings, then received the same confession later "after a suspect has been fully advised of
and has waived his Miranda rights." Id. The Oregon.Supreme Court had held that the prior confes-
sion violating Miranda had the effect of preventing defendant's subsequent waiver of rights (after
receiving the Miranda warnings) from being voluntary; the police should have told him that his first
confession was worthless. The Supreme Court reversed, finding no violation of Miranda in a convic-
tion based on the second confession. The considerable Miranda jurisprudence was carefully combed,
enmeshed in a spirited exchange between Justice O'Connor (for a 6-3 majority) and Justices Brennan
and Stevens in their dissents (joined by Justice Marshall). One need not agree with Justice O'Connor
that "The Court has carefully adhered to this [Miranda] principle, permitting a narrow exception
only when pressing public safety concerns demanded [citing Quarles]." Id. at 317. Nor does the
decisional evidence compel full agreement with Justice Brennan:
Even while purporting to reaffirm these constitutional guarantees, the Court has engaged of late
in a studied campaign to strip the Miranda decision piecemeal and to undermine the rights
Miranda sought to secure. Today's decision not only extends this effort a further step, but
delivers a potentially crippling blow to Miranda and the ability of courts to safeguard the rights
of persons accused of crime.
Id. at 1299. However, it is clear that en route to Elstad something had happened to Miranda. This
"nibbling" process, short of overruling, has also been effectively at work in fourth amendment deci-
sions of the Burger Court (see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)). In a key statu-
tory area, the availability of federal habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (1982)) the Burger
Court's transformation of previous doctrine by "nibbling" rather than overruling has been still more
drastic. (Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (opinion by Justice Brennan) with Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (opinion by Justice Rehnquist) and Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. 2639
(1986) (opinion by Justice O'Connor, summarizing developments since Sykes)). In this criminal
justice area, as in the Court's commerce clause-tenth amendment imbroglio of Wirtz-National
League of Cities- Garcia; see supra text accompanying note 47, high level political judgments are in
contest among the Justices. In the commerce clause cases the paramount concern is federalism; in
the criminal justice cases the high level contest pits individual rights against social order. In Car-
dozo's much-repeated phrase, "the scheme of ordered liberty," see supra text accompanying note 74,
continually calls for current decisional choices that are, at root, political.
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4. Constitutional Limitations of Governmental Power #2: The
Equal Protection Elements of the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments95
What has the Supreme Court done with the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment? A brief survey can mark out the claim that
the Court's use, non-use, and formulations of "equal protection" have
been in furtherance of distinctly political objectives. Its decisions con-
cerning race and sex and general participation in the electoral process
will serve as our examples that the politics of the Court in its equal pro-
tection decisions has indelibly marked the nation.
Race
Unlike due process, which for almost our first century limited only
federal power, equal protection entered the constitutional scene as a limi-
tation solely on the states.96 The Slaughter-House Cases 7 in 1873, the
first decision to "give meaning to this clause," went right to the point:
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so
clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other.
9 8
In 1880 in Strauder v. West Virginia,99 after repeating these assertions of
Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court reiterated:
It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was
framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white
persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general govern-
95. "[N]or shall any State.. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"[N]or shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Although the fourteenth amendment by its terms applies only to state action, and there is no
specific mention of "equal protection" in the fifth amendment, the Court has construed the due
process clause of the fifth amendment to have an "equal protection component" that is applicable to
the federal government. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), involving segregated schools in the District of Columbia, initiated this
development, which is now firm.
96. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499.
97. 83 U.S. ( 16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
98. Id. at 81. The Court looked at the three Civil War Amendments (13th, 14th and 15th) as a
whole, and concluded:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the
foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had for-
merly exercised unlimited dominion over him.
Id. at 71-72.
99. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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ment, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the states. too
Since the equal protection clause reads: "nor shall any State... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"' °1
these cases, of necessity, recognized that the reach of the amendment was
broader than discrimination against black persons. In Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins' °2 in 1886 the Court found the administrative discrimination of a
San Francisco ordinance against Chinese laundry operators to be a denial
of equal protection.
The hospitality to blacks in equality adjudication was given a rude jolt
in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases."°3 In these cases the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which
required equal accommodations for blacks in certain public and quasi-
public facilities. The most crushing judicial blow, however, came in 1896
in Plessy v. Ferguson.'" In that case the Court sustained the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana law that required "equal but separate accommo-
dations" for "white" and "colored" railroad passengers.,0 5 The decision
was promptly extended to legalize for. seventy-five years racially segre-
gated schools. The political thrust of these decisions in the era of Black
Codes0 6 and Jim Crow did not escape the first Justice Harlan, who vig-
orously dissented in both the Civil Rights Cases and in Plessy. His words
in Plessy were prophetic:
[W]e boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all peoples. But it
is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practi-
cally, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of
our fellow citizens, -our equals before the law. The thin disguise of
'equal' accommodations [will] not mislead any one, nor atone for the
wrong this day done .... In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered
will, in time prove quite as pernicious as the decision made [in] the Dred
100. Id. at 306.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
102. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
103. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
104. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
105. The statute required railroads to "provide equal but separate accommodations for the
white, and colored races .. ." Id. at 540.
106. The landmark reference to Black Codes and Jim Crow is C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974). "[T]he provisional legislatures established by President
Johnson in 1865 adopted the notorious Black Codes. Some of them were intended to establish sys-
tems of peonage or apprenticeship resembling slavery." Id. at 23. "[T]he segregation statutes, or 'Jim
Crow' laws... [i]n bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement.. were comparable with
the black codes of the old regime, though the laxity that mitigated the harshness of the black codes
was replaced by a rigidity that was more typical of the segregation code. That code lent the sanction
of law to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and
drinking... to virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals,
orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries." Id. at
7. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952):
"The 39th Congress, convening in December 1865, witnessed a variety of proposals, all designed to
strike down the offensive Black Codes." Id. at 1325.
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Scott 107 case.' 0 8
The road back from Plessy was slow and tortuous. A relentless cam-
paign of case-by-case litigation by the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) finally bore fruit in 1954 in
Brown v. Board of Education, 1 9 which held the Plessy-segregated schools
an unconstitutional violation of equal protection. Brown marked the be-
ginning of an era"o in which the Supreme Court removed constitutional
protection from other aspects of Jim Crow embodied in racially inspired
state and federal legislation. The Court "formulaized" this political de-
velopment by establishing an exacting standard by which it would mea-
sure classifications by race of governmental laws and action- the "strict
scrutiny" test that required a showing by the government of a "compel-
ling governmental interest," and in addition that the racial classification
was "necesssary" to further this "compelling interest," there being "no
less drastic means" by which the governmental objective could be
achieved. 1
The length of the strides taken by the Court under this formula can be
seen by recalling the previous almost total impotence of the equal protec-
tion clause as a limitation on governmental action. As recently as 1927
Justice Holmes had dismissed an equal protection argument against a
state sterilization law as "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments."" 1
2
The Brown program of court-supervised school desegregation at first
proceeded at a snail's pace.'1 3 Eventually the Court's frustration pro-
107. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 56 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
108. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. The theme of the "Brown era" is developed in Broderick, Preferential Admissions and the
Brown Heritage, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 123, 136-76 (1977), an article written on the eve of the Bakke
decision: "[I]n the spirit of Brown [the Supreme Court] has struck down previously tolerated legisla-
tion that impinged on (the] dignity and full citizenship of blacks, often waving the standard of race
as a 'suspect class'. In this same spirit came effective national legislation, for the first time in three-
quarters of a century, which made voting a reality and gave realistic hope of removing discrimina-
tion in employment and housing. Overwhelmingly, the Court interpreted and enforced this legisla-
tion in the spirit of Brown.. . . In this same spirit, professional and educational groups in public and
private sectors recognized the need to help qualify the long-neglected black citizens for leadership
and professional service .... To their credit, these professional persons and educators saw their pro-
grams as filling a national need- in the spirit of Brown." Id. at 172. In retrospect, one suspects that
the Brown era began to wind down (if it did not end) with the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke.
Supreme politics was still in vogue, but it was different, again.
11. The "means" part of this "strict" end-means test is frequently phrased in terms that the
means used must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the "compelling" governmental objective. See
infra text accompanying notes 286-90.
112. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
113. The Court itself conceded as much in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), a
landmark case which stated that "state-compelled dual systems [were] nevertheless clearly charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38.
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voked it to approve more severe judicial enforcement measures, finally
giving its sanction to court-ordered busing."1 4
Just as the NAACP litigation program had forced the Court's hand in
Brown, the vigorous civil rights movement of the late 1950's and the
1960's prompted Congress to enact the two most sweeping civil rights
statutes since the Civil War-the Civil Rights Act of 196415 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.116 The Supreme Court found no difficulty in
upholding their constitutionality. t7 The politics of race on the Supreme
Court had indeed turned around.
One unanswered constitutional question lingered unsolved into the
years of the Burger Court: To what extent could racial classifications be
used not to stigmatize and burden blacks, and other racial minorities, but
to advantage them-to make up, in part, for the damage wrought upon
blacks both before and after the Civil War by state-enforced slavery,
Black Codes, and Jim Crow. Here we finally reach the problem of affirm-
ative action, whose constitutional dimensions will be construed within
the rubric, and politics, of equal protection.
1 8
Sex
The Supreme Court's involvement in the politics of sex, oddly enough,
commenced on the same day that Slaughter-House"1 9 marked out the
Court's initial (later repudiated) t2 ° view that the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause was predominantly directed to considerations of
race, the remedial concerns of the new black citizens. Bradwell v. Illi-
nois 121 is the favorite museum piece of the Supreme Court's early politics
of sex. The majority opinion in Bradwell (as in Slaughter-House) was
written by Justice Miller, who observed at the outset: "The opinion just
delivered in the Slaughter-House Cases renders elaborate argument in the
present case unnecessary." '22 An Illinois statute had denied Myra
Bradwell admission to the state bar for the sole reason that she was a
woman. In affirming the decision below against Mrs. Bradwell, Justice
114. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(17) (1982).
116. Id. § 1973-1973bb-1.
117. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v.
McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(Title II [public accommodations section] of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
118. The affirmative action developments are discussed in Part III, infra text accompanying
notes 235-366.
119. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
120. In rejecting the continuing relevance of the "one pervading purpose" (see supra note 98)
doctrine of Slaughter-House, Justice Powell acknowledged that it was the Court's "initial view."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. But, he maintained, it was outdated by subsequent decisional developments.
See infra note 349.
121. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
122. Id. at 139.
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Miller considered only the "privileges and immunities" clause of the
fourteenth amendment.123 He held that membership in a state bar was
not among the "privileges and immunities of national citizenship" to
which the Court had confined that clause in Slaughter-House. 124 Consid-
ered in these terms Justice Miller was concerned with the politics of state
autonomy in face of the fourteenth amendment, and not directly with the
politics of sex. However, Justice Bradley, concurring, could not leave
well enough alone and plunged headlong:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature itself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life .... The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother.1
25
He briefly reflected that "It is true that many women are unmarried and
not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising
out of the married state .... 126 This consideration did not give him
pause for "This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things and cannot be based
upon exceptional cases." 127 Justices Swayne and Field joined Bradley in
this concurrence. Only Chief Justice Chase, dissented; he had joined
Bradley, Swayne and Field in dissent in Slaughter-House; but apparently
Bradley's concurrence here was too much for him. 121
One year after Bradwell, in Minor v. Happersett,129 the Court conceded
that women are "persons," and may be "citizens" for purposes of section
1 of the fourteenth amendment. 3 ° The Court then considered Virginia
Minor's claim that state law had unconstitutionally deprived her of the
right to vote. Again, as in Slaughter-House and Bradwell, the Court gave
123. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States;..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
124. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 74.
125. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 141-42.
128. The Bradwell holding and political message was reaffirmed in In re Lockwood, 154 U.S.
116 (1894). A Virginia statute dealt with bar admission for a "person" from another state. Virginia
interpreted "person" as "male person." The Supreme Court found no constitutional flaw. Id. at 118.
129. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
130. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment makes no gender distinction as to "persons":
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
However, section 2, which is concerned with voting, speaks three times of "male" inhabitants or
citizens.
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no space to equal protection. It considered the "privileges and immuni-
ties of national citizenship," and concluded that "the Constitution did
not forbid a state committing that important trust [of voting] to men
alone." 13' This Minor interpretation remained the state of things for wo-
men so far as voting was concerned until the adoption of the nineteenth
amendment in 1920.132
A study entitled "Sex Discrimination by Law"' 133 by two male law
professors fairly characterized the judicial record up to 1971: "[B]y and
large the performance of American judges in the area of sex discrimina-
tion can be succinctly described as ranging from poor to abominable."' 34
In compiling this record the United States Supreme Court was in the
vanguard.
Everybody's favorite case exemplifying the Supreme Court's gender
performance in this period is Goesaert v. Cleary.'35 A Michigan statute
permitted women to serve as waitresses in bars, but not as bartenders.
The statute made an exception for wives or daughters of owners. 36 Jus-
tice Frankfurter, for a 6-3 Supreme Court, commenced his opinion with
the flat statement: "Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women
from working behind a bar."' 37 He then considered the validity under
the equal protection clause of the statute's exception in favor of wives
and daughters, and found that it was "not without a basis in reason.' 38
The statute survived equal protection intact, under the most minimal ra-
tional basis test.
Another indication that in the first seventy-one years of this century
the Court continued to treat women as lesser "persons" comes in the jury
service cases. The Supreme Court approved disparate treatment for men
and women with respect to jury service as late as 1961, in Hoyt v. Flor-
ida. 139 A woman charged with second degree murder had challenged her
conviction on equal protection grounds because a Florida statute relieved
women from jury service who had not "registered with the clerk of the
circuit court her desire to be placed on the jury list.' The Supreme
131. Minor, 88 U.S. at 178.
132. "The right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of sex."
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XIX.
133. Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 675 (1971).
134. Id. at 676.
135. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
136. The statutory exception was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor
establishment. Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465 (quoting MICH. PUBLIC ACTS, § 19(a) (1945)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 467.
139. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
140. Id. at 58.
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Court found no constitutional defect. In 1975 the Court found a basis for
changing the result reached in Hoyt. A defendant sought reversal of a
conviction on the ground that if women could, by law, opt out of a venire
panel (and men could not), a conviction by a jury derived from that panel
would not be a "fair cross section of the community," which the Court
proceeded to find a requisite of defendant's sixth amendment right to
jury trial.'41 But in Taylor and Duren v. Missouri,'42 which reaffirmed it,
the Court still declined to find an equal protection violation against
women.
The turnaround by the Supreme Court, in according women percepti-
ble recognition as "persons" under the equal protection clause, came in
1971 in Reed v. Reed.'43 An Idaho statute permitted men and women to
act as administrators of an intestate estate, but provided that among per-
sons entitled so to act "males must be preferred to females.'" The
Idaho Supreme Court approved this mandatory provision of the statute,
concluding that the aim of the provision was to eliminate one class of
court contests in estate litigation--, where two persons, a man and a wo-
man, were otherwise equally entitled to letters of administration. The
provision thus reduced the work of probate courts by avoiding "a hearing
as to the relative merits... of the two or more petitioning relatives."' 45
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed on equal protection grounds
based on sex discrimination.
The formula used in deciding this case signaled no departure from the
words used in Goesaert :146 "The question presented by this case, then, is
whether a difference in sex of competing applicants for letters of adminis-
tration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to
be advanced" by the statute. 47 But the music was different. Chief Jus-
tice Burger's opinion acknowledged that "Clearly the objective of reduc-
ing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is
not without some legitimacy."' 48 However, giving closer attention than
usual to the means used, the Court concluded that "[b]y providing dis-
similar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated,
the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.'
49
141. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 422 (1975).
142. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
143. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id. at 76.
146. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); see supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
147. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 77. Three years prior to Reed the Supreme Court had engaged in very rigorous appli-
cation of the supposedly minimal rational basis test in two cases challenging state statutes penalizing
illegitimacy. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
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What had changed? Not the language of the equal protection clause,
nor the two-tier basis for the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
clause: either the "strict scrutiny" "compelling state interest" test or the
minimal scrutiny rational basis test.15 ° The inclusion by Congress of
"sex" discrimination with respect to employment within the prohibitions
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641's had not been anticipated and had been
brought about almost by chance.152 However, in 1971 the House of Rep-
resentatives15 had passed the proposed Equal Rights Amendment and
the measure was under consideration in the Senate.
154
After Reed ' 55 the Supreme Court took under consideration an almost
continuous stream of cases concerning alleged sex discrimination. 5 6 Af-
ter the Senate passed the Equal Rights Amendment, on March 22,
1972,17 the Supreme Court decided Frontiero v. Richardson.'5"
In Frontiero a female member of the armed forces claimed that, con-
trary to the existing statute, she was constitutionally entitled to claim her
spouse as a dependent with respect to quarters allowances and medical
and dental benefits on an equal basis with male members of the armed
forces. The Supreme Court held the offending statutory provision un-
constitutional under the equal protection component of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented. 5 9
Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Brennan cited the develop-
150. The Court would expressly reaffirm this two-tier equal protection test two Terms after
Reed. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
152. In 1963 Congress had passed The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57
(1963)(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982)), which purported to secure for women a measure of
equal pay for equal work. Title VII, the equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, was not in the original civil rights bill. It was added to the bill by Congressman Peter Rodino
of New Jersey in subcommittee on September 25, 1963. C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 35 (1985). As introduced, title
VII did not bar sex discrimination. The motion to include "sex" was made from the floor of the
House by a vigorous opponent of the civil rights legislation, Judge Howard W. Smith of South
Carolina, who had hoped (in vain) to secure thereby a few votes to block passage of the bill. Id. at
117.
153. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
154. The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972. H.J. Res. No.
208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Section 1 of the proposed (but ultimately unratified) amendment
stated that "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex."
155. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
156. Between 1973 and 1980 the Supreme Court decided the following sex discrimination cases
(invidious and benign) in the equal protection context: Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 717 (1975); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
157. S.J. Res. 8, S.J. Res. 9, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
158. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
159. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ments reviewed above," 6° and concluded that sex discrimination, like dis-
crimination based on race, should receive the strictest judicial scrutiny,
and trigger the compelling state interest test. 161  Justice Stewart con-
curred in the judgment, but did not join the Brennan opinion, simply
resting his conclusion on Reed.1 62 Three other Justices who found the
statutory provision unconstitutional also cited Reed. However these Jus-
tices (Powell, Burger and Blackmun) cited an additional reason for "de-
ferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test of judicial scrutiny": 163  the Equal Rights Amendment
pending before the states for ratification. Writing the concurrence for
these Justices, Justice Powell commented on the Brennan opinion: "It
seems to me that this reaching out to preempt by judicial action a major
political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not re-
flect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes."
'64
Three years later, in Craig v. Boren,165 Justice Brennan again wrote on
this subject. In this case, an Oklahoma law differentiated as to age with
respect to the sale and purchase of beer: the permissible age for male's
was twenty-one, for females, eighteen. Although the sex discrimination
in this situation favored females, rather than disadvantaging them, the
litigants and the Court did not stress this distinction. While purporting
to rely on Reed 166 for a controlling precedent in holding that the statute
violated equal protection in using the sex classification, Justice Brennan
reformulated the test. No longer was it simply a rational basis test, beefed
up, as in Reed: "[C]lassifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' 6 7 The Court soon recognized that it had departed
from its rigid two-tier classification in equal protection matters. The
Craig v. Boren test was accepted by the Court in later cases 168 as a square
breakthrough. Henceforth sex (or gender) discrimination would be con-
160. Id.
161. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688. The argument that "strict scrutiny" should be limited to race (in
view of the Slaughter-House "one pervading purpose" theme (see supra note 120)) had been weak-
ened by the Court's decision two years earlier in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), ex-
tending the "suspect classification" category to aliens.
162. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See the controversial Woodward-Armstrong "account of the inner
workings of the Supreme Court from 1969 to 1976." R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1979). They propose an anecdotal account of Justice
Brennan's bid to secure a fifth vote for his Frontiero plurality opinion that makes interesting reading.
Id. at 254-55.
163. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
164. Id.
165. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
166. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
167. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
168. Mississipi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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stitutionally tested neither by the "strict scrutiny" "compelling state in-
terest" test, nor by an unsteady, if tougher, version of the minimal
"rational basis" test.' 69
Voting Rights
The most thundering "Yes" to our question--does the Supreme Court
engage in politics in its constitutional decision-making-is in the area of
voting rights. A case can be made that the Court's pre-1962 voting deci-
sions could be defended as faithful interpretations of express provisions
of the Constitution.17 0 The reapportionment and "fundamental" voting
interest decisions of the 1960's hardly leave room for doubt that they
were politically inspired.'
The Constitution, as originally adopted, had unusually specific provi-
sions with respect to qualifications of 'members of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate.' 7 2 The Constitution, however, left it to the
states to prescribe "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives," reserving power in Congress to
"make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors."'' 73 However, no specific qualifications were fixed for "Electors"
(voters) for members of the House: "the Electors in each State shall have
the qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature." The members of the Senate were to be "chosen by
the [state] legislature," a provision which continued until 1913 when the
seventeenth amendment provided that the two Senators allotted to each
state should be "elected by the people," that is, by electors whose qualifi-
169. This story would be incomplete without calling attention to two cases in which the Court
revived its taste for gender politics by ignoring the intermediate Craig v. Boren test. See supra text
accompanying note 167. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), the Court upheld a
statutory rape law which permitted conviction of male, but not female, participants in intercourse
when the woman was under eighteen. The Court's ground for not testing the statute by the Craig v.
Boren test was that "the sexes are not similarly situated," id. at 469, in this setting. Similarly, in
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), Congress' failure to require women as well as men to
register for the military draft was upheld, on the ground that, as to the draft, men and women were
"not similarly situated" because, the Court pointed out, women were by statute "excluded from
combat." Id. at 77.
170. As will be noted later in this section, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan so regarded them.
But this view is premised on a stunted view of the equal protection clause that had shielded voting
discrimination since Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 129-32.
171. A third development on voting rights in the 1960's-the removal of practical barriers to the
exercise of voting rights by black, and other minority citizens-found substantial Supreme Court
support. But the laboring oar here was carried by Congress in response to the determined public
protests of the Civil Rights Movement under the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Cf.
Voting Rights Act of 1965). For this reason, I shall limit my discussion here to the general voting
rights decisions, which were distinctively Supreme Court products.
172. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 3.
173. Id. § 4.
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cations were identical to those for the House.'74 Article I, section 2 also
enjoined Congress to apportion Representatives "among the several
states... according to their respective numbers. . .. "
A. Reapportionment.
1. The Pre-1962 Cases.
In 1875, in Minor v. Happersett, which I have already mentioned in
connection with the gender cases,' 76 the Court considered various con-
stitutional possibilities (but not equal protection), and concluded that
"[The] Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suf-
frage upon any one."'
' 77
In the period of dormancy of equal protection in the voting area, the
only constitutional protection with respect to voting discrimination
seemed to be that afforded by the fifteenth amendment against racial dis-
crimination in voting.'7  To this, in 1920, was added the nineteenth
amendment's similar prohibition against voting discrimination "on ac-
count of sex." 179  In 1927, the Supreme Court finally attended to the
rampant discrimination against black citizens by exclusion from Demo-
cratic primaries in Texas. The Court surprisingly invalidated two state
laws on fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds, and not in reli-
ance on the fifteenth amendment."80
174. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
elected by the people thereof.... The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures." U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
175. "Until 1842 there was the greatest diversity among the States in the manner of choosing
Representatives because Congress had made no requirement for districting .... Congress then pro-
vided for the election of Representatives by districts .... In 1850 Congress dropped the require-
ment.... The Reapportionment Act of 1862 required that districts be of contiguous territory.... In
1872 Congress added the requirement of substantial equality of inhabitants.... This was reinforced
in 1911 .... But the 1929 Act... dropped these requirements." Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
555 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
177. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875).
178. "Sec. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
"Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
180. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). A subsequent Texas statute which continued the
racial exclusion was also held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932). The use in these cases of the equal protection clause (which had previously been
ignored in vote cases) seems to have been prompted by the Court's hesitation at that time to consider
the primary an essential part of the state's electoral process so as to trigger the fifteenth amendment.
See supra note 178. In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), the third round of the Texas racial
voting cases, the Court refused to find violations of either equal protection or the fifteenth amend-
ment, expressly holding that a party primary was not "state action," but mere private action beyond
the reach of either amendment. Grovey was subsequently overruled in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944), which held that the Texas white primary violated the fifteenth amendment. Finally, in
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Still another case in which the Court would flatly reject an equal pro-
tection basis for countering voting discrimination came before the Court
in 1946. In Colegrove v. Green 181 it appeared that Illinois had not reap-
portioned its congressional election districts since the census of 1900.
Twenty Illinois districts had populations from 112,116 to 385,207.12
Plaintiffs, qualified voters living in districts with populations ranging
from 612,000 to 914,000, sued state officials "to restrain them, in effect,
from taking proceedings for an election in November 1946" under the
existing congressional districts. 8 3 Plaintiffs (petitioners in the Supreme
Court) claimed a right to'relief under article 1,184 and under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected peti-
tioners' claim by a 4-3 vote. Three Justices agreed with the plurality
opinion of Justice Frankfurter, which declined to consider petitioners'
claim on the ground that "this issue [is] of a peculiarly political nature
and therefore not meet for judicial determination .... To sustain this ac-
tion would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought
not to enter this political thicket."' 18 5 The controlling vote was furnished
by Justice Rutledge, who was willing to assume that the controversy was
"justiciable," but so delicate that jurisdiction over it "should be exercised
only in the most compelling circumstances."
18 6
Three Justices dissented. Justice Black's dissent in Colegrove, joined by
Justices Douglas and Murphy, completely foreshadows Baker v. Carr,1
87
the 1962 case which would overrule Colegrove :16 years later:
Appellants claim that since they live in the heavily populated districts
their vote is much less effective than the vote of those living in a district
which under the 1901 Act is also allowed to choose one Congressman,
though its population is sometimes only one-ninth that of the heavily
populated districts. Appellants contend that this reduction of the effec-
tiveness of their vote is the result of a wilful legislative discrimination
against them and thus amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.1
88
Having stated the contentions, Justice Black found jurisdiction, jus-
ticiability, standing, and the kind of injury for which "equity can and
should grant relief." He concluded that "Such discriminatory legislation
seems to me exactly the kind that the equal protection clause was in-
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) Texas' attempt to circumvent Smith v. Allwright by staging an
all-white pre-primary primary was likewise held to violate the fifteenth amendment.
181. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
182. Id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 550 (Frankfurter, J.).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
185. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552, 556.
186. Id. at 565.
187. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
188. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 567-68.
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tended to prohibit. . . ."' But he was in dissent.
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot 190 in 1960 the Court considered the claim of
black voters, grounded both in equal protection and in the fifteenth
amendment, that they had been unconstitutionally redistricted out of the
municipality of Tuskegee, and thus denied the right to vote in its munici-
pal elections. The Court unanimously upheld plaintiffs' claim. Justice
Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the Court, and distinguished Colegrove:
The appellants in Colegrove complained only of a dilution of the strength
of their votes as a result of legislative inaction over a course of many
years. The petitioners here complain that affirmative legislative action de-
prives them of their votes and the consequent advantages that the ballot
affords. 191
The decision was expressly rooted in the fifteenth amendment. Only Jus-
tice Whittaker, concurring, would have rested it on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
92
2. The Reapportionment Decisions.
In the next Term Baker v. Carr 193 came before the Court. It was ar-
gued, and then set down for reargument and decision in the following
Term. With a single exception' 94 it was Colegrove revisited. The petition-
ers claimed that ancient state districting (even the year-1901-was the
same as in Colegrove) "denied the equal protection of the laws accorded
them by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States by virtue of the debasement of their votes."' 95 They sought a
"declaration that the 1901 statute is unconstitutional and an injunction
restraining [state officials] from acting to conduct any further elections
under it."' 96 This time the Court was politically attuned to make the
leap it had resisted in Colegrove and succeeding cases. '97
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court dealt patiently and skillfully
one by one with the alleged constitutional obstacles to the result.198 . It
189. Id. at 569.
190. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
191. Id. at 346.
192. Id. at 349.
193. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
194. Unlike petitioners in Colegrove, the plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr challenged only the district-
ing of both houses of the state legislature, not of congressional districts. Their case was uncompli-
cated by concerns as to Congress' authority under article I. See supra notes 172-75. They relied
solely on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
195. Baker, 369 U.S. at 188.
196. Id. at 195.
197. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 328 U.S. 281 (1948) - two
cases in which a majority of the Supreme Court explicitly adhered to Colegrove.
198. Shortly after his retirement from the Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren was asked to
identify the single most important opinion of his period on the Court. Without hesitation the author
of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), pointed to Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Recollections of Mr. Justice Warren, TRIAL LAW. Q., Fall 1973, at 5, 9
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left to the usually restrained and mild Justice Clark any response to the
heavy handed criticism of Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justice Harlan)
in his dissenting opinion.' 99
Justice Clark, who had not been expected to join the majority,2"
voiced another view of the Court's role in his concurrence:
It is well for this Court to practice self-restraint and discipline in consti-
tutional adjudication, but never in its history have those principles re-
ceived sanction where the national rights of so many have been infringed
for so long a time. National respect for the courts is more enhanced
through the forthright enforcement of those rights rather than by render-
ing them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges. In my view
the ultimate decision today is in the greatest tradition of this Court.20 1
Within two years the Court formulated the standard by which legisla-
tive reapportionment was to be judged in state as well as in federal elec-
tions. The congressional election rule came down first, in Wesberry v.
Sanders in 1964: The standard for congressional districting plans enacted
by state legislatures "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. "202
Later in the same Term, in June 1964, the Court held unconstitutional
one or both houses of the legislatures of six states. The lead case of this
cluster, Reynolds v. Sims,2a3 is generally credited with establishing the
"one person, one vote" formula with respect to voting in statewide elec-
tions. 2" Chief Justice Warren's opinion stressed that "The Equal Pro-
(excerpts from Chief Justice Warren's conversation with Dr. A. Sacher, Chancellor of Brandeis Uni-
versity, Dec. 11, 1972). Baker became a point of departure for the Court, not only in equal protec-
tion voting reapportionment, but in matters of Article III standing, subject matter jurisdiction, and
political question jurisprudence.
199. Justice Frankfurter led off by expressing chagrin at the Court's disrespect for stare decisis
"The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one
by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago." Id. at 266-67.
He then expressed disbelief at the Court's ready containment of the "political question" doctrine,
and disregard of the Court's traditional "caution not to undertake decision where standards meet for
judicial judgment are lacking." Id. at 289. Further, Justice Frankfurter was scornful that the Bren-
nan opinion had suggested no standards for redistricting, either to legislatures or to the district court
on remand. There was the "difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies in this
class of case .... A declaration devoid of implied compulsion of injunctive or other relief would be an
idle threat." Id. at 327-28. Finally, Justice Frankfurter despaired that such judicial overreaching
violated the very notion of democratic government. "In a democratic society like ours, relief must
come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representa-
tives." Id. at 270.
200. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 2, at 136.
201. Baker, 369 U.S. at 262.
202. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). The grounding of the decision was that article 1,
section 2 of the Constitution prescribed that members of the federal House are to be chosen "by the
people."
203. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
204. The phrase originated in Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963), which did not involve legislative redistricting: "[The] conception of political equal-
ity from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seven-
teenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote." Id. at 381.
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tection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state legislative
representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races."2 5
This meant, he continued, that a state must "make an honest and good
faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as
nearly of equal population as is practicable."2 6 In his autobiography
Justice Douglas records that
Between 1962, when Baker v. Carr was decided, and 1970, thirty six
states had reapportioned either voluntarily or under pressure of judicial
decrees, making a reality of the constitutional standard "one man, one
vote," reversing a long tradition of making certain blocs of voters more
powerful than others.20 7
Once the basic standard of "one person, one vote" had been set, the
Supreme Court was faced principally with two sorts of subissues: the ex-
tent to which deviation from equality would be tolerated,20 8 and the
kinds of electoral governmental units and public elections to which the
equal participation requirement would be extended.20 9 These line-draw-
ing contexts after the Court has enunciated its basic political decision
205. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
206. Id. at 577.
207. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 2, at 136; see McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the
Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223 (1968).
208. The range of tolerance varied depending on whether congressional or state districting was
in question. In congressional districting even "small" departures from the "one-person-one-vote"
norm were disallowed. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). The trend in the 1970's was to allow
greater deviation from the norm in state redistricting plans. In Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971),
an 11.9% deviation from equality in a county legislative apportionment was upheld. And in Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), the Court upheld a 16.4% deviation from equality in a state legisla-
ture. In Brown v. Thomson, 463 U.S. 835 (1983), we see this trend continuing in the 1980's. The
Supreme Court tolerates less deviation from equality in court-ordered apportionment plans than in
plans prepared by the legislature. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
209. The one-person-one-vote principle was extended beyond legislatures to units of local gov-
ernment in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In a one-directional series of cases, it was
applied to elections still narrower in scope: a school district election (Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969)), elections to approve issuance of municipal bonds (which local law had
limited to real property taxpayers) (Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969)), and election of trustees of a public junior college district (Hadley v.
Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970)). Finally, the Court drew the line at requiring general voter
participation in a water district election, where the main purpose of the district was to make avail-
able water for farming, and the costs were assessed against landowners. In such circumstances, the
Court held, it was permissible that only landowners vote. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). At least, there was no fundamental right to vote in mem-
bers of the general public, and consequently no need (as in the other cases just cited) for a showing of
"compelling state interest" to uphold narrowing of the electorate. A minimal rational basis showing
would suffice.
Closely aligned with, but distinct from, the one-person-one-vote right-to-vote cases are Supreme
Court cases concerning rights of political parties, both as to access to the ballot and as to manage-
ment of their own affairs without interference from governmental legislation. Since Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the Court has recognized that these concerns derive from "the [first and
fourteenth amendment] rights of individuals to associate for political purposes, as well as the rights
of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively .. " Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 107 S. Ct.
533, 536 (1986). Like the right-to-vote cases discussed above, these political party cases have pro-
duced endless line-drawing by closely divided Courts. Two of the first cases decided in the current
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permit the Court to express its current intensity in pursuing the an-
nounced policy. Once again21 ° it is politics at retail rather than
wholesale.
What was the Court's basic politics in this reapportionment context?
Chief Justice Warren put it this way:
A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in
the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. . .for all citizens, of all places as
well as of all races.211
The political conclusion was not all that clear to Justice Harlan, who
vigorously dissented, 12 nor to some distinguished members of the legal
Academy.213
B. "'Fundamental" Voting "Interests" or "Rights"
One expansive view of the reach of equal protection by the Warren
Court has already been discussed. The "suspect" classification entailing a
"6compelling state interest" and "no less drastic means" was a formula-
tion adopted by the Court to enforce its political conclusion that the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause required more protec-
tion against governmental discrimination rooted in a racial classification
than was afforded by a "traditional" minimal "rational basis" justifica-
tion.21 4 The Court in the 1960's further concluded that certain catego-
ries of interests that were not "rights" in a strict sense could be
considered sufficiently "fundamental" to require justification by the strict
"compelling state interest" test when they were subjected to equal pro-
tection scrutiny.
The first of these categories to be identified 215 was the denial or limita-
tion of the voting franchise. The first case to stress this point, Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections216 in 1966, affirmed "that once the franchise
is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause." And, Justice Douglas stated in
his opinion for the Court invalidating a state poll tax on voting, "[W]here
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection
Term- Munro, 107 S. Ct. 533, and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986)-
furnish particularly apt illustrations.
210. See supra text accompanying note 94.
211. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
212. Id. at 589-632.
213. See Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
1970's, 57-59 (Polsby ed. 1971); Neal, Baker v. Carr, Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.
252.
214. Similarly, increased scrutiny was given sex discrimination, the intermediate variety of Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
215. The other two accepted categories of "fundamental interests" are indigents' access to the
courts, and the so-called right to domestic travel.
216. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined." '2 17 In this voting context, he
concluded "the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so
burdened or conditioned."2 ' Succeeding cases spelled out that
[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide
residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to
others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to
219promote a compelling state interest.
Like the reapportionment cases, these "fundamental interest" deci-
sions assert the Court's political perception that a constitutional democ-
racy entails equal opportunity to participate in governmental decision-
making, and that this requirement merits vigorous judicial enforce-
ment.220 Explaining the, Court's new "one person, one vote" doctrine in
Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren, like Marshall before him, found
the Constitution inevitably "political":
This is the clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Protec-
tion Clause. This is an essential part of the concept of a government of
laws and not men. This is at the heart of Lincoln's vision of "government
of the people, by the people, [and] for the people."
221
He might have recalled that Lincoln's credo from the Gettysburg Ad-
dress had been anticipated by Chief Justice Marshall: "The government
of the Union . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the
people.
222
In the reapportionment cases the Court selected as its mode of enforce-
ment, mandatory reapportionment on the "one person, one vote" stan-
dard. In the "fundamental interest" cases the Court enlisted its strictest
constitutional test to implement its view of a fundamental political
priority.
II. COUNTERARGUMENT AND REPLY: IS A "POLITICS THESIS"
WRONG, INCOMPLETE OR TRIVIAL?
Even a strong partisan of the use of counterarguments as an expository
device must reach a bit to find them very helpful here.223 One might
217. Id. at 670.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); see also Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 331 (1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969). The doctrine was extended in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), to apply
to state laws restricting access of a new political party to the ballot, where the right of association
secured by the first amendment furnished an additional constitutional ground. In this last variation
the Court's subsequent cases have been uneven- again, politics at retail. Cf. Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982); Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
221. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
222. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).
223. In Affirmative Action After Stotts, I used arguments and counterarguments which are more
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expect resistance to the politics thesis on three grounds: (1) it is wrong;
(2) it is incomplete; or (3) it is trivial. But none of these is convincing.
The argument to date for the politics thesis has been simply this: that
in presiding over the development of major areas of constitutional law
the Supreme Court has been demonstrably engaged in politics. It is not a
question of partisan politics, but of the Court's making political choices
en route to its interpretative decisions that constitute the body of consti-
tutional law. These choices are political, because they are impelled not by
settled "law," but by a selection among constitutional possibilities that
are germane to the solution of a case brought before the Court for deci-
sion. 224 As we have seen, this proposition is no new insight. It was ad-
vanced, among others, by two eminent Justices of a generation ago who
would, by contemporary standards be viewed as moderates by some and
conservatives by others-Justices Robert H. Jackson and Benjamin N.
Cardozo. In support of this politics thesis I have given examples of the
Court's "jurisprudential politics"22 in several highly controversial areas
of constitutional interpretation. These slices of constitutional history es-
tablish with rare certainty that the politics thesis is not "wrong,"
whatever one may say as to its being "incomplete" or "trivial."
The counterargument as to "incompleteness" points out that the poli-
tics thesis ignores the fact that the Supreme Court in a great part of its
work functions like a traditional appellate law court, much like the high-
est courts of the fifty states. Of course it does, as Justice Jackson recog-
nized in his study,226 and the politics thesis makes no extensive claims in
this area of the Court's work. This is the case, for example, in interpret-
ing congressional statutes, in exercising supervision of the diversity juris-
familiar in philosophical than in legal discourse with respect to various "policy" reasons for affirma-
tive action goals. Broderick, supra note 14, at 187-207.
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1) and (2) with respect to appeals,'and 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (3) with respect
to certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982). The "appeal" is of "right." But the grant of "certiorari" is
completely within the discretion of the Justices. If four Justices vote "yes," "cert." is granted.
225. The term "jurisprudential politics" was earlier used by the French jurist, Maurice Hauriou,
with respect to the functioning of the Conseil d'Etat. Unlike the common law countries, the French
do not handle complaints against official action in the ordinary courts of law, but before separate
administrative courts presided over by the Conseil d'Etat. Hauriou, long the dean of the law school
at the University of Toulouse, wrote 370 notes (or commentaries) to decisions on public law by the
Conseil d'Etat which were published currently with the decisions from 1892 to 1929. They were
published in three volumes (totalling 2363 pages) in 1929 under the title NOTES D'ARRfTS SUR
DECISIONS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT ET Du TRIBUNAL DES CONFLITS. Hauriou suggests that the Con-
seil d'Etat usually seeks to tie its decisions to some legislative text (however remote), and avoids
explicit resort to theory. However, Hauriou has no illusion that the Conseil d'Etat's answers have
been found in the texts to which it refers, and he continually points out in his "Notes d'Arrats" the
social, economic and political "reasons" for its decisions. His reference to this High Court's tech-
nique as "the jurisprudential politics of the Conseil d'Etat" occurs in NOTES D'ARRfTS, Volume I,
at 389, and Volume II at 180. The suggestion here is that "jurisprudential politics," or "constitu-
tional politics," has a striking parallel applicability to describe the actual functioning of the Supreme
Court in deciding constitutional cases that are not explicitly controlled by a clear constitutional text.
226. R. JACKSON, supra note 15 , at 28-48.
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diction of the lower federal courts,22 7 and, ordinarily, in functioning as
the highest court of the national judicial system in matters where no spe-
cial constitutional issue is at stake. This counterargument continues: the
politics thesis is also incomplete in ignoring the question that has chiefly
occupied academic critics of the Court- what constitutes the preferred
mode of functioning by the Supreme Court if it is to fulfill its role in the
constitutional plan. Again, the politics thesis pleads nolo contendere. To
be sure this difficult and worthy concern remains to be dealt with. But
the problem of "good" vs "bad" politics is not within the claimed reach
of the politics thesis. It describes how the Supreme Court has functioned,
not how it should function.
But, continues the counterargument, surely such a limited politics the-
sis is vulnerable to the charge of triviality. What claim can it have to our
interest if it refuses to grapple with such significant questions as "good"
constitutional methodology, or "good" politics? Surely the most critical
question facing the Supreme Court is the one which has sparked such
disagreement in recent years, on and off the Court, the appropriate limits
of judicial review.228 And of this the politics thesis says not a word. Also
ignored by the politics thesis is the nagging complaint that an appointive,
lifetime, activist Supreme Court is undemocratic in character.229
I shall defer a full reply to this charge of triviality until Section VI,
below. For the moment this summary will suffice: The politics thesis
makes a contribution to current constitutional discourse by focusing
upon the political fashions which the Supreme Court has used in consti-
tutional interpretation across its entire history. The sole unifying factor
among them is that they have been different, the particular political
choices of particular Supreme Courts of a particular age. In the absence
of broad concurrence or compelling evidence (which is absent from the
academic debate) as to "appropriate" constitutional method, the compet-
ing proposals remain just that-proposals. Moreover, they are political
227. But a constitutional federalism thread is apparent even here. In the leading modern diver-
sity case, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court overruled a decision of
almost a century's standing, Swift v. Tyson; 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), stating constitutional
grounds. In Erie the controlling constitutional ground seems to have been the Court's conclusion
that Swift had wrongly assumed that the federal courts had power to make decisional law in areas
where Congress lacked power to enact statutes. In short, the Court viewed Erie as correcting a
judicial intrusion upon the tenth amendment (although the Court also spoke of "grave discrimina-
tion by non-citizens against citizens" under the Swift doctrine which "rendered impossible equal
protection of the law." Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.) In the Supreme Court's most recent full-bodied
pronouncement on the subject of application of state law in federal diversity cases, in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court stressed the equal protection clause as the foundation of the
Erie doctrine. (Between 1938 and 1965, of course, the Court had considerably expanded the constitu-
tional reach of equal protection. See supra text accompanying notes 109-17, 139-69, and 193-221).
228. Recall that judicial review, as a doctrine, refers directly to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803).
229. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-9 (1980).
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proposals, in the sense discussed here, whether specifically grounded in
some version of economics, history, political or moral philosophy, or sta-
tistical "facts." Some of these proposals are immediately recognizable as
extreme, including recent proposals from high places.230 The most ex-
treme identify themselves either as elements of a theater of the absurd, or
(more likely) as laying political groundwork for a substantial revision of
the constitutional system, perhaps through the device of the proposed
constitutional convention. The welcome revival of interest in principled
legal theory has produced some more conventional jurisprudential views.
Some of these highlight still another attribute of the politics thesis: its
perception that general legal theory and constitutional theory are signifi-
cantly different, and that each will profit by our keeping focus on that
difference.
The core of the difference is this: Both general law and constitutional
law are in a constant state of enactment. With general law the enactment
is both decisional and statutory. With constitutional law the enactment
is exclusively decisional, the amending process by design is difficult and
has, in fact, rarely been successful.2 3 1 Paradoxically, the ready availabil-
ity of corrective legislative oversight has reinforced in general law what
was originally a very conservative doctrine of the common law - the
hostility to judicial decisional change embodied in stare decisis. No such
inflexible rigidity is required or feasible in constitutional interpretation.
Noting the controlling significance of this distinction was one of the fun-
damental insights of Chief Justice Marshall. Not once but twice, in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,232 he called attention to this principled distinction
between interpreting general law and interpreting a constitution. First,
he was inquiring whether the Constitution's assignment of powers to
Congress must be interpreted literally. Marshall concluded that enumer-
ated powers did not exclude implied powers: "In considering this ques-
tion, then, we must never forget it is a constitution we are
expounding. ' 233 Shortly thereafter, rejecting a narrow interpretation of
the "necessary and proper" clause of article 1, section 8, clause 19, Mar-
shall returned to his theme:
This-provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. To have prescribed the [particular] means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change,
entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a
legal code.234
230. See infra notes 404 and 409.
231. See infra note 411.
232. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
233. Id. at 407.
234. Id. at 415.
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III. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: AN EXAMPLE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN OPERATION
In the years after Brown v. Board of Education 235 in 1954, the Supreme
Court uniformly struck down instances of racial discrimination in gov-
ernmental facilities. However, not until 1974 did the Court agree to hear
a case involving the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. In
that year the Court heard argument in DeFunis v. Odegaard,236 in which
DeFunis, a white student, challenged a University of Washington Law
School admissions program which allotted a percentage of entering seats
to black students. After oral argument the Court declined to decide the
merits of the case. Instead, it dismissed the case on the ground of moot-
ness, as DeFunis had been admitted subsequently and was on the verge
of graduation.237
The issue returned to the Court three years later.238 Allan Bakke, a
white applicant for admission to the Medical School of the University of
California at Davis, challenged the School's preferential racial admission
program on equal protection grounds, and the California courts upheld
his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, ordering the medical school to
admit Bakke. The Court was hopelessly divided as to the grounds for its
decision. Four Justices (in an opinion by Justice Stevens) found that the
state institution's racial preference program violated title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,239 thus failing to reach the constitutional issue of
equal protection. 2 ' The fifth Justice supporting the judgment in favor of
Bakke, Justice Powell, found it necessary to reach the equal protection
issue and did so, ruling that Bakke's equal protection rights had been
violated by the medical school's use of race as a classification for admis-
sion. There were four dissenting Justices who (in an opinion by Justice
Brennan) considered the constitutional issue, but ruled that the preferen-
tial admissions program, though racially specific, did not violate Bakke's
constitutional rights.24' Having cast his vote with the four title VI Jus-
tices to constitute a majority in favor of Bakke's admission, Justice Pow-
ell then agreed with Justice Brennan's four to form a separate 5-4
majority holding that a racially specific affirmative action program could,
in certain circumstances, be supportable against an equal protection
challenge.242
235. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
236. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
237. Four Justices dissented and would have reached the merits, favorably to the law school's
affirmative action admissions program. Id. at 320, 348.
238. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l to -6 (1982).
240. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 412, 421.
241. Id. at 379.
242. Id. at 272, 320.
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Central to the differences between Justice Powell's and the Brennan
Four with respect to Bakke's equal protection rights was Justice Powell's
insistence upon the most demanding constitutional standard, the "com-
pelling state interest" test. This test required a governmental body using
a racial classification in dispensing a state benefit to demonstrate that the
racial classification was necessary to satisfy a "compelling state interest,"
and show that "no less drastic means" other than the racial classification,
as used, would satisfy that interest.243 Justice Powell's controlling opin-
ion on the equal protection issue held that a rigid quota, such as the 16 of
100 seats reserved for minorities by the medical school, was per se uncon-
stitutional.2"However, he went on to allow that, provided there were
findings of past racial discrimination at the medical school, a racial pref-
erence affirmative action program might pass constitutional equal protec-
tion muster, as a remedy for the past race discrimination. Remedying
such actual past discrimination (but not merely societal discrimination)
would constitute the required "compelling State interest." If "necessary"
to remedy the past discrimination a racial preference program could be
upheld.245
Although Justice Powell spoke just for himself, his vote was also cru-
cial to establishing the majority of the Court on the secondary question,
whether racial preferences could ever be constitutionally upheld. There-
after, his strict "compelling state interest" test, rather than the interme-
diate "substantial relation to a compelling state interest" 246 test of the
Brennan Four was taken by most federal courts as the Supreme Court's
measure of the constitutionality of a racially specific affirmative action
plan.2
47
The following year, in 1979, the Supreme Court heard another affirma-
tive action case, United Steelworkers v. Weber. 48 Weber raised the ques-
tion whether title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196449 permitted a
voluntary affirmative action plan that resulted in a white senior worker,
Weber, being excluded from a plant training program designed to train
unskilled workers for higher paying jobs. Under the affirmative action
243. Id. at 299, 305. Justice Powell offered two variations of this "means" requirement: (1) that
the means (racial classification) be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest,"
id. at 299; and (2) that the means be "necessary... to the accomplishment of its purpose or the
safeguarding of its [compelling] interest." Id. at 305.
244. Id. at 307, 319-20.
245. Id. at 307-08; see id. at 299, 305.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67 (discussion of Craig v. Boren test for sex
discrimination).
247. Only the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to accept this Powell test as
constitutionally required. Its preference for the Brennan Four test (in Bakke) was finally reproved by
the Supreme Court last Term in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). See infra
text accompanying notes 280-90 for discussion of Wygant.
248. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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plan adopted by the plant management and the union "at least fifty per-
cent of the new trainees were to be black until the percentage of black
skilled workers in the Gramercy plant approximated the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force."2 ' Justice Brennan's opinion for a 5-2
Court upheld the plan, as permitted by title VII, noting that no constitu-
tional issue was involved.2
The Weber Court did not suggest that every voluntary affirmative ac-
tion plan would be valid, but listed criteria that, if satisfied, would be
sufficient to satisfy title VII. These criteria were met in Weber: (1) the
plan was designed "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories"; 25 2 (2) the plan did "not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees"; 25' and (3) the plan was tem-
porary, with the racial preference terminating when "the percentage of
black skilled craft workers in the Gramercy plant approximates the per-
centage of blacks in the local labor force. 1254
One year later, the Court addressed the constitutional equal protection
issue as it relates to affirmative action for the first time since Bakke. In
Fullilove v. Klutznick2" the Supreme Court upheld, by a 6-3 vote, a con-
gressional set aside of ten percent of the $4,200,000,000 appropriation of
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977256 for qualified "minority
business enterprises" against an equal protection challenge.
In Fullilove, as in Bakke 25 7 a Court majority did not identify a single
test of the constitutionality of a racial preference affirmative action pro-
gram. This time only three Justices258 adhered to the less demanding
Brennan Four test from Bakke.2' 9 The opinion of Chief Justice Burger,
to which Justices Powell and White adhered, supplied the other three
votes of the six-Justice majority. This opinion specified only that the plan
under attack passed constitutional muster under the Bakke opinions of
either Justice Powell or Justice Brennan.26 ° Once again, then, after Fulli-
love one must refer to Justice Powell's restrictive Bakke opinion to con-
clude (or conjecture) the standard of the Supreme Court for upholding
affirmative action. Still, the Burger opinion in Fullilove did seem to find
support for its conclusion in the factors suggested in the non-constitu-
250. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
251. Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in the case. Id. at 195.
252. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209.
253. Id. at 208.
254. Id.
255. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
256. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6736 (1982).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 238-47.
258. Justices Marshall (who wrote the opinion), Brennan and Blackmun. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
516-17.
259. See supra text accompanying note 246.
260. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.
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tional context of Weber. There was an adequate Congressional designa-
tion in the legislative history that the purpose of the minority set-aside
was to remedy past racial discrimination in the building trades.26' The
set-aside did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white" contrac-
tors.26 2 The program was temporary as it was limited to the funds ap-
propriated in the 1977 statute.2 63  Finally, one can see in the Burger
opinion consonance with the Weber stress that an affirmative action pro-
gram be "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance [discrimi-
nation] in traditionally segregated [business] categories." 2" The Burger
opinion laid particular stress on the fact that there was no rigid quota
here, as there had been in Bakke, but rather a "flexible" allotment that
would be made only to those minority contractors who had in fact suf-
fered from the effects of the prior discrimination. In this context, "where
the burden on non-minority firms [was] relatively light,"265 the race-spe-
cific preference was "equitable and reasonably necessary to the redress of
identified discrimination. ' 266 While joining the Burger opinion, Justice
Powell also wrote separately, 267 and seemed to mitigate somewhat the
rigor of his Bakke test.268
In 1981 and 1983 the Supreme Court heard arguments in two affirma-
tive action cases but did not reach the merits. 269 However, immediately
after dismissing the 1983 Boston Firefighters case, the Court granted cer-
tiorari in a case involving the same issue- whether a court-approved
affirmative action plan supersedes the protection afforded majority work-
ers under the "last-hired first-fired" provisions of a bona fide seniority
system.27°
The Courts decision in Stotts27 1 at the end of the 1983 Term created
consternation as to the future, if any, of affirmative action. The Court's
decision on "the issue at the heart of the case," 272 while disappointing to
advocates of affirmative action, was not totally unexpected. Writing the
opinion for a 5-4 Court, Justice White stated this question succinctly:
Whether the district court exceeded its powers in entering an injunction
261. Id. at 473.
262. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
263. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 489; cf Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
264. Cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
265. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197; see Fullilove 448 U.S. at 478.
266. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
267. Id. at 510.
268. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305, 320; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510.
269. Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981) (judgment appealed from
was not "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982), and want of a properly presented
constitutional question); Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter NAACP, 461 U.S.
477 (1983)(dismissed as moot).
270. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.), 467 U.S. 1105 (1983).
271. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
272. Id. at 572.
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requiring white employees to be laid off, when the otherwise applicable
seniority system would have called for the layoff of black employees with
less seniority.
27 3
His answer to this question, spoken for the Court, was "Yes," and the
court of appeals decision was reversed as a violation of title VII.
2 74
There was no constitutional holding or discussion in Stotts. However,
towards the close of his majority opinion, Justice White intimated: (1)
that no race-specific relief could be given under title VII except to per-
sons who were shown to be specific victims of the identified race discrimi-
nation;2 75 and (2) that no relief could be extracted from the terms of a
consent decree under title VII beyond that which a district court was
entitled to award after a litigated action. 276 The first of these intimations,
if insisted on by the Supreme Court, would effectively eliminate the de-
sign of the extraordinary remedy of affirmative action goals against recal-
citrant employers who had failed to respond to less drastic remedies for
race discrimination. The second would remove considerable incentive
from parties in discrimination actions to settle their differences, in prefer-
ence to fully litigating them at trial. The structure of title VII, the Court
had agreed, showed a strong congressional preference for conciliation
and settlement.2 77
In the ensuing year, 1984-85, the courts of appeal showed a remarka-
ble reluctance to take literally these intimations. 278 The Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the intimations just discussed in two of the three af-
firmative action cases decided in the 1985 Term.
2 7 9
Two of the 1985 Term cases, Wygant,28 0 and Sheet Metal Workers,28 '
gave new attention to the constitutional standard under equal protection.
Once again it was Justice Powell who was the controlling vote in these
equal protection cases, and who took great pains to refine the stan-
dard.2 82 At the end of the 1985 Term there was still no majority equal
protection standard for race-preference cases. However, it was clearer
273. Id. at 572-73.
274. Id. at 583.
275. Id. at 579-80.
276. Id. at 576 n.9.
277. See id. at 616 (citing Carson v. American Brands Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981): "Con-
gress expressed a strong preference for encouraging voluntary settlement of employment discrimina-
tion claims.").
278. The cases are discussed in Broderick, supra note 14.
279. Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). But it was in the third case, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.
Ct. 1842 (1986) that Justice Powell went back to the drawing board with respect to the constitutional
test for remedial racial preferences. In his opinion for the Court he overturned a public body's af-
firmative action plan as beyond permissible limits. See infra text accompanying notes 280-90.
280. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
281. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
282. Since the Court majority in Sheet Metal Workers found the plan valid under title VII, it was
compelled to consider the equal protection issue. Id. at 3052 (Brennan opinion), and 3054 (Powell
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than ever that any race-conscious (or sex-conscious) affirmative action
case must pass the test refined by Justice Powell, or not survive.
In Wygant, the Jackson Board of Education's affirmative action pro-
gram with its teachers union contained a provision protecting minority
teachers against layoffs that would reduce minority teachers below a cer-
tain percentage at the majority black school. Although there was no
identified race discrimination in evidence, the district court upheld the
plan. It was acceptable "as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination
by providing role models' for minority schoolchildren."2 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The opinion of the 6-3 Court reversing the court of appeals was writ-
ten by Justice Powell. Faced with the equal protection claim of a white
school teacher who had been laid off as the result of the racial preference,
Justice Powell moved firmly to state the applicable test. Citing other
cases, but principally Bakke and Fullilove, Justice Powell simply clarified
the "compelling state interest" test he had stated in Bakke. There are, he
wrote, "two prongs" to the "most searching examination." The first
dealt with the purpose of the racial classification: "any racial classifica-
tion must be justified by a compelling governmental interest."2 4 This
part of the test was not met, because there had been no showing of "prior
discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited
use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination."28
The second prong of the test is that "the means chosen by the State to
effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal.' ,286 Recognizing that there had been some restlessness at the
term "narrowly tailored," and whether it represented a softening of his
Bakke approach, Justice Powell elaborated: "The term may be used to
require consideration whether lawful alternative and less restrictive
means could have been used." Or, he added, "narrowly tailored" may
mean that "the classification at issue must 'fit' with greater precision than
any alternative means." '287 Justice Powell conceded that the "narrowly
tailored" means requirement left room for some " 'sharing of the burden'
by innocent parties."28 However, the burden imposed by layoffs was
excessive. "Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals,
they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose."
opinion). As these opinions pointed out, the constitutional provision in question here was "the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
283. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1847.
286. Citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480 (Burger, C.J.).
287. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850.
288. Id.
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The Powell opinion in Wygant denied that the layoff plan satisfied either
prong; there was no "compelling state interest" because.there had been
no sufficient showing of past discrimination. 9 Nor was the second
prong satisfied: the "burden to be borne by innocent individuals" was too
great for the remedial means to be considered "narrowly tailored".
"Other, less intrusive means of accomplishing similar purposes- such as
the adoption of hiring goals- are available."'2 90
Sheet Metal Workers was principally concerned with title VII.291 As
Justice Brennan put it at the outset of his plurality opinion, the central
issue was "whether the remedial provision of title VII empowers a dis-
trict court to order race-conscious relief that may benefit individuals who
are not identified victims of unlawful discrimination. ' 292 The Court an-
swered this question "Yes," with Justice Powell, who wrote a concurring.
opinion, joining the judgment of a 5-4 Supreme Court.
Once the title VII question had been answered it was necessary to as-
certain whether the affirmative action ordered by the district court vio-
lated "the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because they deny benefits to white individuals based
on race." Justice Brennan for the plurality (that included Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun and Stevens) referred to the disagreement on the Court
as to the proper test, and simply concluded that "the relief ordered in
this case passes even the most rigorous test-it is narrowly tailored to
further the Government's compelling interest in remedying past
discrimination."
293
In his concurrence, which was essential to the result reached by the
majority, Justice Powell reiterated verbatim his two-prong end-and-
means test, and his statements from Wygant (set out above) were re-
peated verbatim. As to the end, or purpose, the lower courts' findings
"that petitioners have engaged in egregious violations of Title VII estab-
lishes, without doubt, a compelling governmental interest sufficient to
justify the imposition of a racially classified remedy. '294  The lower
courts had approved a percentage membership goal as a remedy, and
Justice Powell referred to his Wygant specifications in focusing on
whether the remedy was "narrowly tailored" to "eradicating the discrim-
ination. ' 295 Justice Powell also referred to four factors he had stressed in
Fullilove 296 "when considering, the proper scope of race-conscious hiring
289. "[T]he trial court must make a factual determination that the employer had a strong basis
in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary." Id. at 1848.
290. Id. at 1852.
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
292. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3019, 3025.
293. Id. at 3053.
294. Id. at 3055.
295. Id.
296. See supra text accompanying note 262.
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remedies": "(i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned dura-
tion of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minor-
ity workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group
members in the relevant population or work force; and (iv) the availabil-
ity of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met." Justice
Powell then adverted to still another standard, "A final factor of primary
importance that I considered in Fullilove, as well as in Wygant" - "the
effect of the [remedy] upon innocent third-parties." '97 Justice Powell
found these five factors satisfied in Sheet Metal Workers. The "imposi-
tion of flexible goals as a remedy for past discrimination" did not unduly




Justice Powell had foreshadowed the Sheet Metal Workers result as to
hiring goals in his Wygant opinion, and he used precisely the same refine-
ments of the same two-prong formula in both Wygant and Sheet Metal
Workers. However, at the end of his Sheet Metal Workers opinion he
cautioned against a formalistic categorization of the results in the two
cases-and presumably in others:
Of course, it is too simplistic to conclude from the combined holdings in
Wygant and this case that hiring goals withstand constitutional muster
whereas layoff goals and fixed quotas do not. There may be cases, for
example, where a hiring goal in a particularly specialized area of employ-
ment would have the same pernicious effect as the layoff goal in Wygant.
The proper constitutional inquiry focuses on the effect, if any, and the
diffuseness of the burden imposed on innocent nonminorities, not on the
label applied to the particular employment plan at issue.299
IV. THE 1986 TERM CASES: JOHNSON AND PARADISE
The common factor in Johnson3° and Paradise3° 1 concerns promo-
tions, unlike the 1985 Term cases,3 2 which concerned layoffs and hiring
goals. Beyond this common note, the two cases involve distinctive issues.
Although both Johnson and Paradise concern public employers, and
therefore potentially concern the constitutional equal protection issue,
297. Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3055 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514).
298. Id. at 3057.
299. Id. at 3057 n.3.
300. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Calif., 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986). The Question accepted for review in Johnson was: "May
a public employer lawfully promote a less-qualified female candidate over a more-qualified male
employee allegedly pursuant to affirmative action plan adopted solely to eliminate statistical dispar-
ity in workforce unrelated to sex discrimination." Id.
301. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. United States v.
Paradise, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986). The sole question accepted by the Court for review in Paradise was:
"Is promotion quota permissible under equal protection guarantees of Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments?" Id.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 280-99.
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the white female plaintiff in Johnson did not challenge the governmental
agency's affirmative action plan on equal protection grounds, but only as
a violation of title VII. Should the Court agree with the court of appeals
that the affirmative action plan passed the title VII Weber test,30 3 and
identify the equal protection test as more strict,3° 4 it might also measure
the plan against the constitutional standard. I will discuss Johnson here
solely as involving title VII. In any event Paradise raises the equal pro-
tection issue, and solely that, by the specific terms of the grant of
certiorari.3 °5
Johnson
The Johnson case is unlikely to make large waves with respect to af-
firmative action. The fact that the case deals with sex discrimination,
rather than race discrimination, can hardly be viewed as relevant under
title VII, which bars sex and race discrimination alike. An interpretation
of title VII which afforded lesser affirmative remedies for past sex dis-
crimination than for past race discrimination would be bizarre, and con-
sidered so by the Court.
3 0 6
Close technical questions may well determine the Court's disposition
of Johnson should the Court address solely the question whether the vol-
untary government plan satisfied the Weber title VII test. Was the court
of appeals' view "that women had been traditionally underrepresented in
the relevant job classifications"3 °7 properly equated to the Weber "mani-
303. See supra text accompanying notes 252-254.
304. Some courts of appeals have read the Supreme Court as having, by Fullilove v. Klutznik,
448 U.S. 448 (1980), in effect, equated the Weber (title VII) and the equal protection standards for
affirmative action. Kromnick v. School Dist., ,739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
782 (1985); Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc); Boston Chap-
ter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2154 (1985); see also
Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 967 n.4 (8th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981). It is somewhat clearer after Sheet Metal Workers (see supra text accompanying notes 291-99)
that the Supreme Court views the title VII (Weber) test and the equal protection test as distinct.
305. See supra note 301.
306. Should the Supreme Court affirm Johnson on title VII grounds, and go on to consider
whether the government plan in this sex discrimination case ran afoul of equal protection, the Court
would have an opportunity to reconsider an incoherence in its equal protection case law. Presently,
its test for benign (and for invidious) sex discrimination is the "substantial relation to an important
state interest" test of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (see supra text accompanying notes 165-
68). Recall that the Brennan Four's attempt in Bakke to apply this intermediate test to remedial
racial preferences failed. See supra text accompanying note 246. The Court has not rejected Justice
Powell's insistence in Bakke upon a more rigorous (compelling state interest) test for remedial racial
preferences, than for remedial sexual affirmative action. For Justice Powell's remarkable defense of
this odd result, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03:
Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical problems in pref-
erential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With respect to gender there are only
two possible classifications. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications
is clear. There are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential
treatment. ...
307. Johnson, 748 F.2d at 1308, 1310.
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fest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories?"3 8 Did
the court of appeals' reversal of the district court's determination that on
the facts the Weber test had not been satisfied by the government
agency's affirmative action plan violate the "clearly erroneous" standard
for appellate review?3" Still more likely to be scrutinized by the Court is
whether the sexual preference with respect to promotions in a small em-
ployment unit ran afoul of Weber's caution that "[t]he plan does not un-
necessarily trammel the interests of white [male] employees."3 0 The
problem of affirmative action with respect to the promotions question
will likely receive the Court's close attention, particularly in view of the
small promotion pool, and the consequent greater burden on the affected
male employees, considerations underscored by Justice Powell in Wy-
gant. The possibility looms large that the Court will remand the Johnson
case to the district court (perhaps via the court of appeals) for further
fact-finding in light of the Court's likely reaction to some of the "techni-
cal" questions presented. Still, the Johnson case is in the stream of the
"politics" theme stressed in this article. A narrow or more flexible inter-
pretation of the Weber test here will carry a further signal with respect to
the Court's hospitality for affirmative action plans for identified employ-
ment discrimination-sexual or racial.
Paradise31 '
In 1972 the NAACP brought a class action suit against the Alabama
Department of Public Safety (the Department), alleging racial discrimi-
nation by the defendant Department against blacks in hiring in violation
of the fourteenth amendment and various federal civil rights statutes.
The United States was made a party plaintiff, and Phillip Paradise, Jr.
was allowed to intervene on behalf of a class of black discriminatees.
After a hearing Chief District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. found that
the Department had "engaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and
practice of" discriminating against blacks in hiring. In addition to in-
junctive relief he ordered the Department to hire one black trooper for
each white trooper hired until the state trooper force comprised approxi-
mately twenty-five percent blacks.31 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court, rejecting the Department's contention
308. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
309. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), the Supreme Court held for the first
time that "an intent to discriminate on account of race... is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule
52(a)'s [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] clearly erroneous standard. It is not a question of
law and not a mixed question of law and fact .. " Id. at 288-89.
310. Weber, 443 U.S. at 195. A further "technical" question raised by the Johnson review is not
of special interest to us here: who has the burden of proof when an employer claims a "valid"
affirmative action plan as an affirmative defense to a (sex) discrimination claim under title VII?
311. See supra note 301.
312. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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that the race-specific hiring relief violated the fourteenth amendment.
The court also held that the affirmative hiring relief "was essential to
make meaningful progress towards eliminating the [Department's] un-
constitutional practices and to overcome the patrol's [Department's]




In 1975, the plaintiffs moved the district court for further relief, and
after hearing evidence, the court enjoined the Department "from artifi-
cially restricting the size of the troopers force for the purpose or with the
effect of delaying or frustrating achievement of the goal of having blacks
comprise 25% of the trooper force." '314
Relief with respect to the discrimination of the Department as to pro-
motions did not surface until September, 1977, when plaintiffs asked for
supplemental relief. As a result of extensive discovery, a partial consent
decree was agreed to by the parties and approved by the district court in
February, 1979."' In this 1979 consent decree defendants "agreed to
develop a promotion procedure which would be fair to all applicants and
have 'little or no adverse impact on blacks seeking promotion to corpo-
ral.' "I6 Two years later the Department submitted to the district court
a proposed procedure for promotion to corporal. Objections were raised
by both plaintiffs and the United States, but the parties resolved their
differences in another consent decree (1981 decree). The parties agreed to
try to mutually resolve future differences concerning selection procedures
for corporals. However, they agreed (in the 1981 decree) that if they were
"unable to resolve their differences, the matter was to be submitted to the
district court for resolution.
31 7
The Present Proceedings
The particular Paradise case now before the Supreme Court was initi-
ated on April 7, 1983 when plaintiffs moved the district court to enforce
the terms of the 1979 and 1981 consent decrees. In view of the fact that
no progress had been made by the Department in formulating the "fair"
promotion procedure, plaintiffs sought a district court order requiring
the Department to promote blacks to the corporal rank "at the same rate
at which they have been hired, 1 for 1, until such time as the defendants
313. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974).
314. This passage is taken from the court of appeals opinion in Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d
1514 (11 th Cir. 1985), the case presently before the Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit was carved
out of the old Fifth Circuit. It has adopted as precedents decisions of the former Fifth Circuit that
were handed down prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981)(en banc).
315. Paradise, 767 F.2d at 1519.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1521.
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implement a valid promotional procedure."3 8 After extensive hearings,
and consideration of the Department's proposed promotion procedure,
the district court enjoined the Department from using the procedure, rul-
ing that it "adversely impacted on blacks." '3 19 Subsequently, on Novem-
ber 10, 1983, the Department submitted another promotion procedure
for corporals, which plaintiffs opposed. Finally, on December 15, 1983
the district court issued the order which is the subject of present review
in the Supreme Court. Citing the Department's urgent plea of an "imme-
diate need to promote 15 new corporals, ' 32" and the parties failure to
agree on a promotion procedure, the district court "in accordance with"
the 1979 and 1981 decrees "undertook to fashion a [promotion]
procedure."
31
The provisions of the district court's order, which are the subject of
the present Supreme Court review, in pertinent part are as follows:
"[T]emporarily, at least, 50% of all promotions to corporal and to higher
ranks must be filled by qualified black troopers. '322 Due to the district
court's "concern over the Department's delay in developing acceptable
promotion procedures for all ranks,, 32 3 "the Department [shall] pro-
mote one black trooper for each white trooper promoted to a higher
rank, if there is a black trooper objectively qualified to be promoted to
the rank, until either (1) approximately 25% of the rank is comprised of
black troopers, or (2) the defendants have developed and implemented a
promotion plan for the rank conforming with the prior orders and de-
crees in the case and all other legal requirements., 324 Subsequently, after
a hearing, the district court denied motions to reconsider or alter this
order. The Department, the United States and the intervenors appealed
to the court of appeal, which affirmed the district court order in its en-
tirety, ruling that the plan was permissible, both under title VII and the
fourteenth amendment. 325 As we have seen only the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection question was granted review by the Supreme
Court.
The court of appeals, after citing Bakke and Fullilove, complained "of
the absence of a definitive Supreme Court standard for judging the con-
stitutionality of affirmative action. '326 It is not helpful to our present
task to review the Fifth Circuit cases on which the court of appeals re-
318. Id. at 1522.
319. Id. at 1523.
320. Id.




325. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (1lth Cir. 1985).
326. Id. at 1531.
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lied.327 However, it is not only germane, but indispensable, to consider
the findings and statements which the district court identified as the
predicate to its promotion order. 328 First, consider the findings and
statements of the district court opinion of December 15, 1983, with the
emphasis in the original:
On February 10, 1984, less than two months from today, twelve years
will have passed since this court condemned the racially discriminatory
policies and practices of the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Nev-
ertheless, the effects of these policies and practices remain pervasive and
conspicuous at all ranks above the entry-level position. Of the 6 majors,
there is still not one black. Of the 65 sergeants, there is still not one black.
And of the 66 corporals, only four are black .... Moreover, the depart-
ment is still without acceptable procedures for advancement of black
troopers into this structure, and it does not appear that any procedures
will be in place within the near future. The preceding scenario is intolera-
ble and must not continue. The time has now arrived for the department
to take affirmative and substantial steps to open the upper ranks to black
troopers. 
329
Next, consider the district court's conclusions, as derived from its per-
ception of the applicable legal standards, for both title VII and equal
protection:"Quota relief was appropriate.. .because such relief was nec-
essary and reasonable." "The relief was necessary because the history of
this case made it clear that the 'intolerable' and 'egregious' racial dispar-
ities in the upper ranks of the Department would not be eradicated ab-
sent 'immediate, affirmative, race-conscious action.' .... The quota relief
was reasonable because: (1) it was a temporary measure; (2) it did not
require the discharge, demotion, or replacement of any white troopers;
(3) it did not require the promotion of any unqualified black trooper; (4)
it did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white troopers; and (5) it
was specifically tailored to redress the present effects of past discrimina-
tion." And finally, the Department had "the prerogative to end the pro-
motional quotas at any time, simply by developing acceptable promotion
procedures." 330
V. SCENARIOS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE 1986 TERM'S
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Does the politics thesis suggest any particular resolution by the
327. The court of appeals decision was handed down prior to the Supreme Court decisions in the
1985 Term affirmative action cases that I have been considering.
328. And, incidentally, which the court of appeals relied on as the predicate for its affirmance of
the district court order.
329. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. 72, 74 (M.D. Ala. 1983) ( cited in Paradise v. Prescott,
767 F.2d 1514, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985)).
330. Paradise v. Prescott, 585 F. Supp. at 75-76.
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Supreme Court of Johnson 331 and Paradise,33 2 the two affirmative action
cases scheduled for decision this Term? It does. But first we should rec-
ognize the role of other institutions in presenting to the Court the issues
raised by these cases. When this is done we are ready to identify the
brand, or brands, of politics that have characterized the ten affirmative
action cases previously decided by the Court.3 3 3
Cases that arrive at the Court for decision have generally been selected
by the Justices for that distinction by their discretionary certiorari pro-
cess. This circumstance obscures the fact that, at least when a major con-
stitutional issue is at stake, other litigating institutions-public as well as
private-have a hand. This year's pair of affirmative action cases is no
exception. Private litigating institutions, such as the NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund (LDF), and the National Organization for
Women (NOW), have figured prominently in cases considered earlier in
the article. While not litigants in these cases, they have submitted amicus
briefs (LDF in Paradise, and NOW in Johnson). In such cases the United
States, through the Department of Justice, often has a role. In Paradise it
was the Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, who alone peti-
tioned for certiorari, and is an active party, once again (as in last Term's
three cases) seeking to restrict the reach of affirmative action. In the pre-
vious (Carter) administration the national government also lent its polit-
ical and legal weight in affirmative action cases but towards expanding,
not limiting such remedial relief. In recent years, conservative litigating
foundations have taken a prominent role in major civil rights litigation,
and in Johnson one of these organizations, through its legal staff, repre-
sented the male employee claiming sex discrimination in Johnson. On
occasion, these institutional briefs sharpen the issues and even fore-
shadow a result. One reads the briefs in Paradise and Johnson and, aside
from having a better grasp of the facts, is little wiser than before.
In Paradise the Solicitor General, as petitioner, insists that the judicial
one-and-one black-white promotion quota is not sufficiently "narrowly
tailored" to pass constitutional muster under Wygant-Sheet Metal Work-
ers. Paradise, representing the class of black plaintiffs, and the LDF, in
separate briefs, insist that it is. In Johnson, the male plaintiff argues that
Santa Clara County's sex affirmative action plan violates both title VII
(and Weber), and equal protection (and Wygant), and the County dis-
331. See supra note 300.
332. See supra note 301.
333. The cases in order of decision were: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S.
105 (1981); Boston Firefighters Union, Local 719 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Local Number 93 v.
City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
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agrees. As in Paradise the briefs dispute whether promotions are more
like hiring or more like layoffs. The oral arguments shed little more
light.334 The participants go home and wait to see how the Court will
draw the line. Will the politics thesis help? Let's distinguish various
modes or brands of politics.
1. Brands of politics.
I have previously suggested various identifiable brands of politics that
gave impetus to decisions of the Supreme Court: federalism politics,335
fair-trial politics,"' race3 3 7 and sex politics,
338 democracy politics. 339
Other, more subtle, political considerations play an evident role in
Supreme Court process: consensus politics,3" stability politics, 34' and a
politics of institutional respectability that includes a reasonable consis-
tency in decisions and pursuit of a principled coherence in constitutional
doctrine.342 There is another brand of politics that seems distinct from
any of the above: what might be called a politics of moderation or
334. Paradise and Johnson were argued in the Supreme Court on November 12, 1986. See brief
report of argument in 55 U.S.L.W. 3345-47. I have consulted the principal briefs. The editor of this
publication, Allen Patterson, attended the oral argument. I am grateful to him for his careful ac-
count and for his other considerable assistance in the preparation of this article.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 31-50.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 51-94.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 95-118.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 119-69.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 170-221.
340. Consensus politics, as bearing on constitutional decision-making, can be understood in two
different ways. First there is the familiar saying of Mr. Dooley: "[T]here's wan thing I'm sure
about .... That is,... th' supreme court follows th' election returns." F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON
THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (E. Bander ed. 1963). Dean Harry Wellington (building on Cardozo) artic-
ulates a more nuanced variety of consensus as a source of law "available to the Court in constitu-
tional cases ... [tihe moral ideals of the community. [They] do not necessarily purport to be right
answers. They constitute conventional moral obligations and aspirations-particularly aspirations.
For moral aspirations may well receive too little attention in the accommodations that characterize
the legislative process." Wellington, History and Morals in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 326, 334 (1983). See also Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 509-20
(1982). One senses that Justices who would bridle if charged with following Mr. Dooley, would not
be too uncomfortable with the Wellington-Cardozo version. Chief Justice Hughes' reference to what
he termed the Court's three "self-inflicted wounds" mirrors the Justices' sensitivity to public accept-
ability of their decisions. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928).
Hughes cited: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 603 (1869); The Income Tax Cases, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429;
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
341. The concept of order or social peace as a constitutional principle was recognized in the
Preamble of the Constitution ("to... insure domestic Tranquility," see infra text accompanying note
410). It was highlighted by Justice Cardozo in his much-cited Palko formula for "due process," as
furthering rights "that are of the essence of ordered liberty." See supra text accompanying notes 71-
75.
342. Despite the poor credentials of stare decisis in constitutional matters (see supra note 47), one
may fairly anticipate consistency as to recent decisions, at least- if not always what Karl Llewellyn
called "reasonable reckonability of decision." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 348 (1960).
52




2. Brands of politics and affirmative action.
Considering the end-product of the series of ten affirmative action
cases decided by the Court, and the mode of achieving it, it can be argued
that the Court has been chiefly influenced by the politics of moderation,
or compromise. I noted above 344 the constitutional formula on which
the Court seems to have settled, in a fragmented way, in last Term's
cases.34 5 Considered as the end-product of the ten-case series the Wy-
gant-Sheet Metal Workers version of the "compelling state interest"
formula may well constitute "moderation." However, from the stand-
point of the advocates of strongly held opposing positions concerning
affirmative action, none of whom can be satisfied with the result, the indi-
343. In the sense intended here "moderation" or "compromise" confronts two conflicting posi-
tions and opts for a middle ground. This choice may ignorewhat seemed to be a principle underlying
some recent decisions (e.g. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)). It may even ignore specific language articulated in recent decisions (e.g. Sheet Metal
Workers, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3049 (1986) in light of Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1984)). Unlike consen-
sus politics' concern for public acceptability, moderation politics chiefly seeks for an interim resolu-
tion that will mitigate the felt injustice (and possible ensuing social unrest) that would result from a
flat decision for one of two contesting social groups. Laurence Tribe's comment on the Supreme
Court's product in Bakke caught the spirit of this nicely:
In this period of national questioning and self-doubt, it may be that the most likely consensus
for the Court would be a fairly reactionary one. In a divided nation, the Court's task often
becomes one of pragmatic statecraft. Given the absence of a more enlightened and liberating
consensus, it is perhaps best that the Court proceed by leaving open possibilities for more con-
structive constitutional development- even at the price of further doctrinal disarray. Far from
lamenting the inconclusiveness of the Court's Bakke decision, for example, I am inclined to
applaud the way in which the Court there cleared the path to progressive future results while
accommodating the reservations deeply felt by many with respect to preferential treatment.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (Supp. 1979).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 280-99.
345. In his brief in Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986), Solicitor General Fried argued
that "Notwithstanding petitioners' patently contumacious conduct ... Section 706(g) of Title VII
prohibits the award of relief such as union membership to persons who are not the actual victims of
illegal discrimination." Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, at 10-11, 26. He
also contended that "the membership quota at issue here contravenes the equal protection compo-
nent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 35. As we have seen, see supra text
accompanying notes 278-99, the Supreme Court rejected these arguments. Nevertheless, the Solicitor
General and the Attorney General seemed to claim partial victory. Solicitor General Fried: "We
have said that race-conscious remedies which are not victim-specific are never permissible .... The
Court has said: 'Not never, but hardly ever.' " N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at B9, col. 1. Attorney
General Meese: "The court has accepted the general position of this administration that racial pref-
erences are not a good thing to have .... What they have done is carved out various exceptions to
that general rule, even while affirming the rule itself." Wash. Post, July 3, 1986, at A7, col. 1.
In his "Brief for the United States" in Paradise, the Solicitor General, talking now to the Court
and not the press, recalled that the United States had sought certiorari in Paradise to vindicate the
same "actual victims" approach the Court subequently rejected in Sheet Metal Workers. Id. at 16.
Recognizing that this argument was no longer available to him, the Solicitor General conceded that
"remedying racial discrimination practiced by a public employer" constituted a "compelling inter-
est" under the Court's cases. Id at 19. He then staked his bid for reversal in Paradise on the argu-
ment that the "non-victims" affirmative action plan was not "narrowly tailored," as he contended
was constitutionally required by the "compelling interest" strict scrutiny test. Id. at 21-30.
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vidual cases in the series have been a procession of disappointments.
Their view might characterize this cluster of cases as prompted by race
or consensus politics well distanced from moderation.
In Bakke,346 as we have seen, the controlling opinion of Justice Powell
rejected the argument (accepted by four Justices in dissent) that societal
discrimination against blacks should itself justify the remedy of affirma-
tive action.347 While acknowledging that the fourteenth amendment had
been recognized in Slaughter-House 348 as having special remedial signifi-
cance for black citizens, Justice Powell abruptly dismissed this historical
and decisional preference as outdated by later developments. 349 As a con-
sequence, his crucial opinion concluded that "strict scrutiny," in effect,
limited the availability of affirmative remedial racial relief to identified
discrimination. Still, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion did salvage affirma-
tive action as a possible remedy for past identified racial discrimination.
The Weber 3' 0 result in 1979 (with Justice Powell not sitting) en-
couraged affirmative action advocates, and was a significant setback for
their opponents. But Weber was a title VII case, and expressly disclaimed
constitutional implications. 351' Further, Weber addressed only voluntary
negotiated private affirmative action plans.352 Fullilove in 1980 was
favorable to racial preferences, but weighted with cautions.35 3 Opponents
of affirmative action could take heart in Chief Justice Burger's warning
that the Court might view more strictly judicially-ordered racial prefer-
ences than it did the Congressionally-designed racial set-asides at issue
in Fullilove. Four years later, in Stotts in 1984, the Court refused to pro-
tect against lay-offs black employees hired under an affirmative action
plan contained in a consent decree. The future of affirmative action was
further clouded when the Court's opinion suggested that only "specific
victims" of the identified race discrimination could be beneficiaries of ti-
tle VII remedial relief, and that judicial consent decrees could not ap-
prove any affirmative action remedy which a federal court could not
prescribe after a full trial. We have seen that these last two hinted
346. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 244-45.
348. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
349. For Justice Powell's express rejection of this historical event as outdated by the wider use of
equal protection in non-racial areas, and the arrival on the American scene of racial minorities other
than blacks, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293-95.
350. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
351. Id. at 200.
352. Id.
353. -IT]his Court has not required remedial plans to be limited to the least restrictive means of
implementation. We have recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is a
'balancing process left, within appropriate limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court.' " Fulli-
love, 448 U.S. at 508. Justice Powell also concluded "that the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable remedies to
advance the compelling state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination." Id. at 510.
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abridgements were expressly repudiated in the Court's 1985 Term
cases. 3 54 But the stress, even there, was on "egregious" racial discrimina-
tion, on unavailability of other effective relief, and on the lack of undue
burden on majority individuals. The door to affirmative action was kept
open, but not wide open, perhaps just ajar.
3. "Prophecies of what the [Supreme Court] will do in fact. ' 355
The above canvass of the road the Court has most recently travelled in
remedial affirmative action situations suggests that although Johnson and
Paradise... each concern affirmative action plans in promotions, the
same result may not be reached in both cases. The central Weber theme
for a title VII case such as Johnson is that the plan must not "unnecessa-
rily trammel" the interests of white (or, in the Johnson context, male)
employees.357 The comparable emphasis in the equal protection analysis,
as made clearer by Justice Powell in Wygant-Sheet Metal Workers,358 is
that the Court will be reluctant to find measures "narrowly tailored"
which, like layoffs, "impose the entire burden 359 of achieving racial
equality on particular individuals." 3"
In the small scale setting of Johnson 3 61 the promotion plan might well
run afoul of the Wygant suggestion that "Other, less intrusive means of
accomplishing similar purposes-such as the adoption of hiring goals-
354. See supra text accompanying notes 279-99.
355. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once defined "the law" as simply "prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
356. See supra notes 300-01.
357. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. See supra text accompanying notes 247-53.
358. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3055-57. See supra text
accompanying notes 279-98.
359. Or, perhaps, an "undue" burden.
360. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1851-52; Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3057.
361. The Supreme Court has not directly adjudicated the question of promotions, as such. Local
No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986), the third of the 1985 Term's affirmative action
cases, did involve promotion goals (contained in a consent decree). Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion points out, id. at 3080, that the Supreme Court did not decide whether the specific relief
provided in the consent decree (including promotions) passed title VII or equal protection standards,
so that it would foreclose those not parties to the consent decree- or could be ordered as an equita-
ble remedy by a district court. The majority opinion agreed that this question concerning promotions
was left open in Local No. 93: "The only issue before us is whether § 706(g) [the remedial section of
title VII] barred the District Court from approving this consent decree. We hold that it did not." Id.
at 3063.
In a section of his plurality opinion in Sheet Metal Workers in which only four Justices joined,
Justice Brennan routinely coupled promotions with hiring goals: "[A] district court may find it nec-
essary to order interim hiring or promotional goals pending the development of nondiscriminatory
hiring or promotion procedures. In these cases, the use of numerical goals provides a compromise
between two unacceptable alternatives: an outright ban on hiring or promotions, or continued use of
a discriminatory selection procedure." Id. at 3037. Justice Powell, who provided the crucial fifth
vote in the Sheet Metal Workers affirmance, studiously limited his concurrence to hiring goals, say-
ing nothing at all about promotions. But see supra text accompanying note 299. Small wonder that
the granting of certiorari in Johnson and Paradise on the promotions issue followed promptly.
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are available." '362 Justice O'Connor, concurring in that "equal protec-
tion" case, suggested that
[T]he Court is at least in accord... that a public employer, consistent
with the Constitution, may undertake an affirmative action program [as-
suming a constitutional remedial purpose] which implements that pur-
pose by means that do not impose disproportionate harm on the interests,
or unnecessarily trammel the rights of innocent individuals directly and
adversely affected by a plan's racial preference.363
On the other hand, in Paradise there were dense findings of egregious
racial discrimination and "exceptional intransigence," and the practical
unavailability of less drastic measures to eliminate the proven discrimina-
tion. These considerations could well lead the Court a step beyond Sheet
Metal Workers, which concerned union membership goals, to sustain
even the more-burdensome-to-majority-parties remedy of race-conscious
promotions. Such a result is particularly plausible in light of the specific
findings of the district court in Paradise 3  that such a plan would not
dislodge any majority individual from a position he had in hand- bur-
den, perhaps, but not dislodge. Under the formulas we have just reviewed
that determination would arguably be enough to sustain the plan.
The 1985 Term cases failed to produce a majority litmus test for the
constitutionality of affirmative action. However, a step backward is not
to be anticipated from the narrow Court majority that would go as far as
Justice Powell. True, the 1985 Term cases dealt with hiring and union
membership, and not promotions. Yet the egregious discrimination laid
bare in Paradise resonates the remedial concerns of Sheet Metal Workers.
Certainly, if ever there were a case in which an affirmative action plan for
promotions would be upheld, it is Paradise.365 A reversal would sur-
prise, and what's more, send out further confusing signals as to the future
of affirmative action. On the other hand, Johnson, like Wygant among
the 1985 Term cases, could be reversed without impairing the availability
of affirmative action programs for promotions, particularly if the Court
affirms Paradise. The fact that Johnson is the first affirmative action sex
case to reach the Court could tilt towards a narrow affirmance. But the
warnings of both Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor of the vulnerabil-
ity of affirmative actions plans that bear too directly on "innocent indi-
viduals" make affirmance in Johnson problematic, at best.366
362. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1852.
363. Id. at 1853-54.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 329-30.
365. Unless the Court seizes the possible, but unlikely, course of mooting Paradise because of
developments in the litigation subsequent to the adoption of the racial preference promotions plan.
See Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1534-38 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("Paradise IFI).
366. See supra text accompanying note 299.
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ITS POINT, LIMITS, ALTERNATIVES,
SUPPLEMENTS, AND VALUE
Earlier in this article I recalled Justice Jackson's proposition that the
Supreme Court cannot "be regarded merely as another law court." '367
He further suggested that the Supreme Court was, in its most significant
work, a "political institution." '368 This insight prompted consideration'of
a thesis of constitutional politics by examining the way the Court has
actually functioned in some crucial areas of constitutional life. This ex-
amination has led us down to consideration of the affirmative action
cases presently before the Court.
It is apparent that this thesis of constitutional politics is purely de-
scriptive of the way the Court has functioned. It says nothing of such
questions as how the Court "ought" to have functioned, and why. Nor
does it deal With the distinction of "good" or "bad" politics, and what
criteria are available to justify this distinction. A thesis which abstracts
from such significant questions as these can at most furnish the beginning
of an adequate constitutional jurisprudence. It is time to summarize the
case that a constitutional politics thesis is both adequate and indispensa-
ble, as such a beginning. Consideration here of the central point of the
constitutional politics thesis, and of its limits, alternatives, supplements
and value, will serve as our conclusion.
1. The Point.
In stressing the central point of the constitutional politics thesis it is
again helpful to return to Justice Jackson, this time to hear his reminder
that, at its beginnings, the Court wrote on a blank page:
[N]either the text of the Constitution nor the debates in the Constitu-
tional Convention gave any clear forecast of the part the Court was ex-
pected to play .... The Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789369 So
far as federal cases were concerned launched a Court without a jurispru-
dence, which is somewhat like launching a ship without a rudder. The
Court of course had no tradition of its own. . . . The Supreme Court was
not bound to any particular body of learning for guidance .... In five of
Marshall's great opinions he cited not a single precedent.
370
Thus, the Court filled the blank page. Wha.t's more, it wrote, and con-
tinues to write, the entire book, the process and product we know as
constitutional law.3 7 ' The Court has done so, the thesis suggests, under
367. R. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 2.
368. Id. at 53-54.
369. An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. XX, I Stat. 73 (1789).
370. R. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 28-30.
371. There are limited restrictions on this freedom beyond the text: (1) Congress' constitutional
interventions with respect to jurisdiction, and (at least since South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)), with respect to the enforcement clauses of
57
Broderick: Constitutional Politics: Affirmative Action and Supreme Process
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1987
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
the stimulus of a particular brand, or brands, of its constitutional poli-
tics.372 Chief Justice Marshall cautioned almost at the outset that "[W]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." '373 Look-
ing back over a century and a half of the Court's work, Justice Jackson
reminds us that "The Constitution has gone through several cycles of
interpretation, each of which is related to the political and economic con-
dition of the period." He identifies three pre-World War I cycles:
Federal powers were consolidated and invigorated under Marshall. A re-
action marked by conflict over the very nature and binding force of the
compact embittered the time of Taney. There followed a period when
attention turned to nationalism and to railroad building and industrial
growth stimulated by a long period of almost uninterrupted peace. That
came to an end in 1914.... 74
The above passage, written in 1954, qualifies as a masterpiece of insen-
sitivity. It considers constitutional history, as Jackson was wont to do,
principally in terms of economics and the tensions of federalism. There is
not a line there to suggest that the nation nearly dissolved over race, and
remained divided even as he wrote. Yet Jackson furnishes the necessary
ingredients of the politics thesis:
(1) It is inescapable in our form of government that authority exist some-
where to interpret an instrument which sets up our whole structure and
defines the powers of the Federal Government in about 4,000 words, to
which a century and a half have added only about half as many amenda-
tory words.
3 7 5
(2) From 1803376 the Supreme Court staked out, and maintained its con-
stitutional claim to be this "authority"; 377 and
(3) The Court has exercised this authority across history in decisional
the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments. (2) The infrequent constitutional amendments: The most sig-
nificant of these after the bloc passage of the first ten amendments (Bill of Rights) in 1791, of course,
have been the post-Civil War Amendments (13th, 14th and 15th). Only two amendments were ex-
pressly adopted to counter a Supreme Court decision: the 11th in 1798 (reversing the Court's deci-
sion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), permitting citizens' suits against states),
and the 16th amendment in 1916 (to authorize a federal income tax, which the Court had blocked in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 335-54 for discussion of "brands" of politics.
373. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
374. R. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 23.
375. Id.
376. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803): "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is .... The judicial power of the United States is
extended to all cases arising under the constitution." Id. at 177-78.
377. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): "[Tihe interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enunciated by this Court... is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution
makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding.' " In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,705 (1974), the Court con-
cluded: "We therefore reaffirm that it is the duty of this Court 'to say what the law is' with respect to
the claim of [presidential] privilege presented in this case" (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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acts and language that do not flow inevitably from Constitutional text,
but from political judgments (wise and unwise) by the Justices of the day
according to their perception of "the political and economic condition of
the period.,
3 7 8
Without attending to the Court's constitutional politics, there is no
understanding the product of that politics, which we know as constitu-
tional law. This is the central point of the thesis of constitutional politics.
2. The Limits.
There are constitutional and practical limits on the Court.3 79  There
are also limits on the illuminative force of the politics thesis.380 I will
mention two.
(1) In large areas of its activity the Supreme Court does function like
an ordinary law court, where political concerns are less inevitable or ap-
propriate. For example, there is the entire area of diversity jurisdiction in
which, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,381 state substantive law is invariably
applied.382 In its interpretation of federal statutes that do not raise con-
stitutional issues the Supreme Court also ordinarily functions like an or-
dinary law court.3 83
(2) Since the politics thesis takes no account of what might be consid-
ered "good" or "bad" politics it is incomplete-and concededly so-as
an explanatory constitutional jurisprudence. This point was discussed
above,384 and will be returned to below.385
3. The Alternatives.
The Supreme Court throughout history has hardly been impeded in its
political choices. 38 6 This practical conclusion has been advanced by a
variety of the Justices themselves. The most familiar instance is Chief
Justice Hughes' statement that "We live under a Constitution, but the
378. R. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 23.
379. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 418-20.
380. See supra note 370 and infra text accompanying notes 399-407.
381. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
382. It can be argued that the Court's repudiation of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), a
decision of almost a century standing, in Erie was itself a political decision rooted in federalistic
concerns and the Court's long hostility to diversity jurisdiction. See supra note 227.
383. An exception might be seen with respect to congressional statutes (such as the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act) which use broad language that entrusts to the courts wide zones for decisional
development. Judicial interpretation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (heavily discussed in
this article with respect to affirmative action) may belong within this exception, especially with re-
spect to equitable remedies. But any interpretation of a congressional statute by the Supreme Court
may be countermanded by further congressional legislation.
384. See supra text accompanying note 228.
385. See infra text accompanying notes 402-14, under "The Supplements."
386. But see supra note 371 and infra text accompanying notes 419-21.
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Constitution is what the judges say it is." '3 87 Justice Harlan Stone, who
would succeed Hughes as chief justice, bitterly dissented when his con-
servative colleagues on the Hughes Court found the first Agricultural
Adjustment Act of the Roosevelt administration unconstitutional. Stone
called the majority decision "A tortured construction of the Constitu-
tion..... "388 However, he acknowledged, "the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self restraint., 3 9 More recently,
Justice White, in his spirited dissent (joined only by Justice Rehnquist)
against the Burger Court's abortion decision in Roe v. Wade,390 stated
that "As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has author-
ity to do what it does today ... 2 9' Justice White added, in effect, that
his complaint was not against "politics," but against what he considered
"bad" politics: "[In] my view [the Court's] judgment is an improvident
and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Consti-
tution extends to this Court.
392
Since the Court has functioned, and is functioning, on the basis of con-
stitutional politics, those who desire constitutional change are faced With
two questions: (1) what alternatives are considered preferable, and (2)
what steps are necessary in order to bring about a chosen alternative.
a) Possible alternatives
Among alternatives that might be considered, the most obvious is to
provide for elected federal (or simply Supreme Court) judges for a term
of years, rather than the present appointments for life.393 A second ap-
proach would leave the lifetime appointments intact, but curtail the
scope of judicial review. President Roosevelt considered, and rejected,
the possibility of requiring more than a simple majority of Justices to
declare legislation unconstitutional. Another possibility within this sec-
ond approach would be to exclude certain issues from federal, or
Supreme Court, review. A third approach would be that actually pro-
posed by Roosevelt, but rejected by the Senate, the addition of Justices to
the Supreme Court.
387. C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185-86 (2d ed. 1916).
388. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 79.
390. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
391. Id. at 222. Justice White's dissent in the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), was applicable to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221 n.*. Justice Rehnquist joined this dissent,
and also dissented separately.
392. Doe, 410 U.S. at 222.
393. Tom Wicker's recent articles in the New York Times' Op-Ed page on the 1986 judicial
election campaign in California, in which the movement to oust Chief Justice Rose Bird was the
centerpiece, are hardly dispassionate appraisals of the pros and cons of judicial elections. But they
make relevant points for consideration before changing the federal lifetime system. Wicker, Rose
Bird and Rehnquist, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1986, at 27, col. 5; Wicker, A Naked Power Grab, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1986, at 25, col. 1.
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b) Means of achieving an alternative
Any alternative that contemplated changing the lifetime appointment
status of federal judges would require a constitutional amendment. Presi-
dent Roosevelt rejected on constitutional grounds a legislative numerical
curtailment of judicial review, and most constitutional scholars today
would likely concur in his constitutional judgment.3 94 The problem of
withdrawing selected issues from Supreme Court, or general federal
court, constitutional consideration, using present congressional control
over federal court jurisdiction, has been proposed in recent Con-
gresses.3 95 Constitutional scholars have differed on the constitutionality
of these plans. More important, practically speaking, is the fact that se-
lective tampering with federal jurisdiction has not yet found favor in
Congress. Despite a broad dissatisfaction in many quarters with some
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, the problem of passage of any of
these alternatives remains as real an obstacle as the question of their con-
stitutionality. One remembers that the highly popular President
Roosevelt could not persuade an overwhelming Democratic Congress to
pass his "Court-packing" plan, months after he won the largest presiden-
tial election ever scored up to that time.39 6 Justice Jackson who, as a high
Roosevelt Administration official, had supported the "Court-packing"
plan, later wrote as a Supreme Court Justice: "The Rooseveltian struggle
with the Court did not impair the power, which is as positively asserted
today [in 1954] as in pre-Roosevelt days."'3 97 Jackson immediately added
prophetically: "But neither did that struggle end the controversy over the
proper use of the power, a controversy which lies just beneath the surface
and is likely to break forth from time to time as long as the Republic
shall last."'3 98
The problem of alternatives is complicated by the public's hesitation to
curb the Court, even while recognizing its warts. Again, Justice Jackson's
words, written at a time when he was himself unhappy with impending
new directions on the Court, bear consideration today:
394. See concerning the "Court-packing" plan, Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Court-Packing Plan, " 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347; Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR 's
Court Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791 (1952).
395. Consider Senator Jesse Helms' amendment (annexed to other proposed legislation), which
was first introduced in 1979 (S. 438, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 2868 (1979)). This
amendment would bar Supreme Court jurisdiction to review "any case arising out of any state stat-
ute [which] relates to voluntary prayers" in public schools, and to withdraw from federal district
court jurisdiction "any case or question" which the amendment denies the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion to review. The practical effect of the amendment is to give finality to state courts' interpretation
of the Constitution on the matter of school prayer, which the Supreme Court had held, in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.
396. See sources cited supra note 394.
397. R. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 22-23.
398. Id. at 23.
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Public opinion... seems always to sustain the power of the Court, even
against attack by popular executives and even though the public more
than once has repudiated particular decisions. . . .The people have
seemed to feel that the Supreme Court, whatever its defects, is still the
most detached, dispassionate, and trustworthy custodian that our system
affords for the translation of abstract into concrete constitutional
commands. 9
4. The Supplements.
A significant virtue of the politics thesis is that it is demonstrable. Per-
haps I have sufficiently made that demonstration.' Without reinforce-
ment from such sources as history, political philosophy, ethics (moral
philosophy), and, some would say, from the social sciences,"' the polit-
ical thesis would be vulnerable to a charge of mindless nihilism. From
time to time the Supreme Court, in its opinions, expressly draws upon
one or another of these supplementary human disciplines4° 2 to convince
its constituency that its politics is "good," not "bad," or "indifferent.'
4 3
More often it does not. However, one or another of these supplemental
disciplines will commonly furnish the starting point (major premise) of
academic lawyers, or historians, or philosophers, social scientists, or law-
yer-journalists, who present themselves as supremely self-confident crit-
ics of the Court.4°
399. Id.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 23-221.
401. One need only recall that the massive change repudiating American constitutional racism in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), occurred under cover of the psychological data cited
in the famous footnote 11 in that case.
402. The notion of "supplement" is used here in the sense that when the constitutional answer is
not furnished by the text or clear legislative history, the Court (or its critic) may call upon another
discipline to portray, or supplement its political conclusion.
403. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the first modern case in which the Supreme
Court denied retroactive effect to a new constitutional ruling. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Clark sought to justify a practical political judgment by a purported philosophical preference for
John Austin over William Blackstone. In later decisions the Court frankly avowed the political
factors involved in its new doctrine of non-retroactivity. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 618 (1967).
404. Two current fashions among critics of the Court are the use of a so-called resort to "his-
tory" with a "framers intent" doctrine, and the fresh illuminations perceived by the arguably still
budding "law and economics" school. (See Easterbrook, Foreword,- The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (pro); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus. Equal Justice or Economic
Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985) (con)). The question of "framers' intent," even with
respect to the foundational question-the doctrine of judicial review itself, see supra note 19, has
never been settled to general satisfaction. The essay of Leonard W. Levy exploring the conflicting
views remains highly useful. L. Levy, Judicial Review, History and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-42 (L. Levy ed. 1967). Approaching slapstick, by contrast, is the
recent report in the press of Attorney General Edwin Meese's address of October 21, 1986 at Tulane
University:
Noting that the Supreme Court can and has overruled its own rulings, [Meese] said citizens and
officials need not assume, as the former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once quipped,
"that the Constitution is 'what the judges say it is.' " Rather than "submit to government by
judiciary," he said, "we as citizens may respond to a decision we disagree with .... Each of the
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When the Court selects one of these supplements to resolve a constitu-
tional issue (leaving aside all the others), or the critic selects another
supplement to belabor the Court's conclusion, this first selectivity is com-
pounded by another. Within the particular supplementary discipline cho-
sen there is usually a variety of views that could lead via that discipline to
different results.4" The difficulty in this selective use of these supple-
ments is twofold: (1) The academic lawyer (or other critic) proceeds from
personally held premises that are not shared by other, equally respected,
critics within their own discipline;" 6 and (2) any one contested viewpoint
three coordinate branches of government created and empowered by the Constitution- the exec-
utive and legislative no less than the judicial- has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the
performance of its official functions." In his speech, Mr. Meese singled out for particular criti-
cism the Supreme Court's statement in a 1958 decision, Cooper v. Aaron [358 U.S. 1. (1958)]
that its historic 1954 ruling [in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483] that the Constitu-
tion barred official segregation of schools was "the supreme law of the land." Mr. Meese said:
"Obviously the decision was binding on the parties in the case; but the implication that every-
one would have to accept its judgments uncritically,.. . was, and is, at war with the Constitu-
tion, at war with the basic principles of democratic government, and at war with the very
meaning of the rule of law."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at 14, col. 1.
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds explained, in an address three weeks
later, that Meese's Tulane speech had set out "to help educate the public about our constitutional
heritage during the Bicentennial celebration." As reported in the press, Mr. Reynolds added:
[M]ost law schools "have largely abdicated their responsibility to educate the future members of
our profession on the Constitution," partly because courses on constitutional law focus "almost
exclusively on specific rulings of the Supreme Court," neglecting the Constitution's text and
history and "the intent of the framers."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at 14, col. 1.
Leadership in the popularization of the law and economics fashion has been taken by Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See R. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983). A convenient grouping of various approaches is contained in the
report of a symposium entitled The Place of Economics Legal Education, J. LEGAL EDUC., June
1983, at 183-368.
405. For example, within the supplementary discipline of "philosophy" divergent results are
inevitably reached depending on whether the "philosophy" used is utilitarian or rights-oriented (or
contractarian). A valuable compilation of this particular divergence among philosophers is contained
in UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R. Frey ed. 1984). A classic instance of philosophers at opposite poles is J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) and
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); see also N. DANIELS, READING RAWLS (n.d.).
The confession by a distinguished utilitarian philosopher that there are limits to the answers that
philosophy can furnish B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985) was rebut-
ted, but very softly, by a fellow utilitarian. H.L.A. Hart, Who Can Tell Right from Wrong, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, July 17, 1986, at 49-52.
See Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986) for a careful demonstration
that academic lawyers produce different results depending on their selection and use (often "mis-
use") of philosophers. Id. at 335. Stick's target is a wing of the critical legal studies (CLS) move-
ment. But his point has broader application.
406. B. Cardozo's THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) is the not quite forgotten
point of departure for what has become American academic lawyers' obsession with judicial method-
ology. Cardozo's book was about appellate judging on a state, largely private law, court. The other
pioneer of judicial studies of the last generation, Karl Llewellyn, also wrote largely of state appellate
judging. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). Unlike
Cardozo, Llewellyn burst on the Academy scene as the brashest of American Realists, whose very
name he coined. "And if to make you see the movement [of judicial law-making] we must shout
down the pious words with which courts have pretended that no change occurred-then we must
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within a supplemental discipline may be "right" or "true" but, unless
this "rightness" or "truth" or "justice" or "fairness" is broadly accepta-
ble, this viewpoint must battle in the field of politics to establish its al-
leged primacy for the right."° In the American constitutional pluralism
viewpoints are disparate, and rarely apt candidates for convincing intel-
lectual demonstration. Some settlement procedure is necessary. To date,
subject to certain democratic checks,"° we have entrusted this settlement
to nine Justices constituted as a Supreme Court, without furnishing
them guidelines on how to proceed. They are, indeed, turned loose
among the "supplements." It is in their selection among the wide variety
of supplements, and in their choice among viewpoints within the supple-
ment selected, that the Justices' "politics" is most likely to be revealed
and refined.
The Academy, the academic critics," 9 proceed much like the Justices,
shout, shout disbelief. We must blaspheme the legal oracles." K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
124 (1930). But by 1960, his views had moderated. No longer a "rule sceptic," Llewellyn concluded
that the courts achieve a "reasonable reckonability of decision," K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 216, and that judges, not scholars, have the superior "situa-
tion-sense." Id. at 352, 447. While the "drive for justice [was] the prime good in law" id. at n. 24,
there was place for the value of "order," id. at 341, and there was not necessarily a "single right
answer" in a case, id. at n.25. Often forgotten is Llewellyn's concluding salute: "The degree to
which my book rests on the American pioneer in the field, Cardozo, speaks again and again .... Id.
at 520. But Llewellyn, like Cardozo, was dealing primarily with the judicial process of the common
law appellate judge. The phenomenon of a branch of the Academy that would deal exclusively with
constitutional law was still a decade or more away. Small question that the Warren Court's concern
with due process rights, with remedying racial constitutional neglect, and with energizing equal
protection, stimulated the new attention given by the Academy to constitutional theory.
The output of this branch of the Academy, particularly in the nation's law reviews, in the last
twenty years has been overwhelming. In addition, there has been available a number of excellent
constitutional case books for law school courses which give more attention than before to constitu-
tional theory and method. Any selection among these theorists must be arbitrary. But a mixed sam-
pling will be instructive as to two points I have been making, (1) that, without reputable exception,
the academic critics of the Supreme Court recognize the Court's constitutional power to establish
constitutional law, while differing as to the most suitable guidelines for exercise of this power; and
(2) that constitutional judicial law-making is best understood as a project distinct, in its essence,
from the decision-making of common law judges.
407. The German legal philosopher von Ihering characterized this phenomenon as "the battle
for the right," and the French public lawyer, Maurice Hauriou, see supra note 225, calls it the "risk
for the right." According to Hauriou,
Society needs proof that an individual right, requested as an attribute of the human person, is
really necessary to this person. There is no more convincing proof than the risk of life or for-
tune .... Society consents, then, to recognize as well-founded an individual right, or to put it
more generally, what is called a social claim, only when the men interested in it show that they
are ready to sacrifice their lives or, at the very least, their goods to obtain it .... And in the same
way, vested individual rights are not assured forever; they need to be defended .... If these
beneficiaries desert what Ihering calls the 'battle for the right' and what we call the 'risk for the
right,' their right is lost.
Hauriou, The Separation of the Individual and the State, in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS 67 (A.
Broderick ed., K. Welling tr. 1970).
408. See infra text accompanying notes 419-21.
409. I am considering here only serious academic critics, not obviously counter-political thrusts
such as recent attacks on the Supreme Court by Attorney General Edwin Meese, and Assistant
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using a particular viewpoint within a selected disciplinary supplement as
the take-off point for their criticism. Unlike their critics, the Justices have
been designated as constitutional officials to interpret and develop consti-
tutional law. The Constitution charges them that this be done in a fash-
ion congenial, as they see it, to the guiding principles set down at the
head of the Constitution: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity."4 ' In carrying out their charge in major
areas the Justices are forced to make political choices, case by case selec-
tions among constitutional alternatives. In doing so they draw on their
own experience as citizens of the Republic, and not just as lawyers.4"1
Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds. See supra note 404. Undoubtedly, Mr. Reynolds will
view this comment as verification of his recent charge that
The overwhelming majority of tenured professors in our law schools today are aligned philo-
sophically with the liberal left, and they view their mission much less in terms of teaching 'first
principles' than in terms of cultivating new recruits to advance their social reform agendas.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1986, at 14, col. 1; see supra note 404.
Of course, the very thrust of the politics thesis is that Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Meese, as members of
the conservative (one might fairly say radical) right, are free to compete with the "liberal left" by
advancing their political views as to how the Constitution should be applied. What is an abuse of fair
debate, and of their office, is to misstate constitutional history by proposing that their current polit-
ical views constitute the "true" Constitution because they represent what is evident from constitu-
tional text and history and "the intent of the Framers." Mr. Reynolds, probably unwittingly, let his
cat out of the bag when he said in his Chicago speech of November 14, 1986: "Regrettably, it has
become the accepted understanding of generations of law students that the 'Constitution is what the
judges say it is.' " Id. at 14, col. 2. For' he knows, as well as we, that this has been the "accepted
understanding" not only of law students, but of lawyers, and of generations of Justices of the
Supreme Court, and judges of the state and federal courts. Desirable or not, this is the present state
of our political system. Meese and Reynolds seek to change it. It is their right to seek "to reshape
American society to their moral liking" id., including the doctrine of judicial review. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-30. What is likely to gall the public is their untrue suggestion that the
Meese-Reyholds remarks are a "useful and much-needed explanation of the judicial process." Id.
Taxpayers, and other citizens and persons, have the right to hope that the Meese-Reynolds program
"to help educate the public about our constitutional heritage during the Bicentennial celebration,"
id. at 14, col. 1, will henceforth shed more light and plain truth, and less heat and plain error.
Eugene C. Thomas, president of the American Bar Association, issued a statement taking issue
with the Meese Tulane speech. "He [Thomas] asserted that Supreme Court decisions 'are the law of
the land,' that 'public officials and private citizens alike are not free simply to disregard' their status
as law and that such disregard would 'shake the foundations of our system.' " N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,
1986, at 14, col. 1.
410. U.S. CONST. preamble. In 1791, only four years after ratification of the Constitution, the
first ten amendments, known as the "Bill of Rights" were adopted, as additional textual elaborations
of these principles. In 1798 the eleventh amendment was adopted, reversing Chisholm v. Georgia.
See supra note 371. Save for the sweeping post-Civil War Amendments (the 13th (1865), the 14th
(1868) and the 15th (1870)), subsequent amendments to the original document have been either
technical, or minor, save for one notable exception-the extension of franchise to women (the 19th
amendment (1920)).
411. When Justices reach the Court they are mature persons, often with well-developed views.
However, these views may be substantially altered in the give and take of High Court experience and
colleagueship. In their first two years on the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, both from Minnesota, were so often on the same side that they were dubbed-the "Minnesota
Twins" (familiar to baseball fans). Court fans know this liason did not last.
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They also draw upon acceptable products of history, philosophy, moral-
ity, and, occasionally, the social sciences (which were unknown in 1787).
As argued above, these "acceptable" products are rarely universally per-
ceived as "best." Different Justices, like the citizenry from which they
come, draw their politics from different supplements.
Academic (and political) critics may well convince some of us that
particular choices which the Justices make are "good," or "bad." The
severest critics of some current choices are often fellow Justices in dis-
sent. And past choices may provoke the mildest Justice to blister an ear-
lier Court in retrospect.41 2 Or a unanimous Supreme Court may overrule
a particularly odious past product of the Court without a severe word.41 3
Like their co-citizens, the Justices may sometimes act on "good" poli-
tics, sometimes follow "bad" politics, and sometimes just "indifferent"
politics. The proper characterization of the quality of their politics may
have to await history's verdict. Meanwhile, to fashion "good" constitu-
tional law is their task, the core of their job description. But the mod-
els-the supplements-are themselves in conflict. Why should it surprise
us that the Justices, among themselves and with their critics, are as
well.41 4 Still, the search for the true measure of "good" must go on,
sometimes with indignation, but hopefully without arrogance.
5. The Value
What is the value of the politics thesis? It furnishes us with a starting
point for understanding the actual operation of the Supreme Court. In
the present absence of a crystal text or a foreordained methodology the
politics thesis recognizes that the Supreme Court works through nine
individual Justices whose background differences will, ideally, mirror the
differences in American society.
In its most significant work this Court has limited guidance from con-
stitutional text.4" 5 Unlike the Marshall Court, it does not write on a
412. Justice Powell wrote in Fullilove, perhaps more in sorrow than in anger: "Indeed, our own
decisions played no small part in the tragic legacy of government-sanctioned discrimination. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857) [sic]." Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 516.
413. For example, the bland psychological explanation in Brown v. Board of Educ. for the rejec-
tion of Plessy's "separate but equal" formula. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
414. Valuable, but mutually discordant, approaches in most recent academic writing on consti-
tutional decision-making include: Michelman, Foreword. Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1986); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures.- Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013
(1984); Cover, Foreword: NOMOS and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Wellington, The
Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 548 (1982), and J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980). Ronald Dworkin's influential rights-oriented studies, see infra note 424, are not included
here because, although he thrives on discussing constitutional matters, he professes to be fashioning
a theory of judicial law-making in general law, and not in constitutional law as such.
415. Consider "due process, "equal protection," "freedom of speech," "Commerce...among
the several States," "the judicial power of the United States," "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
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blank page, or in a blank book, but in a book that contains the historical
record of its (and our) past successes and failures.416 The Court contin-
ues to write, mindful of its past, of our present, and of the nation's fu-
ture.4" 7 Subject to real, if limited, external constraint, the Supreme
Court must maintain or reformulate past interpretations of a sparse and
honored text. Its politics aspires to constitute, in the old phrase, thejuris
prudentia, the wisdom of "right" law. And it needs all the help it can get.
While recognizing that much of the Court's work, if not all, is open to
change, the politics thesis permits us to identify extravagant and radi-
cally dissonant accounts of the constitutional process by dissenting voices
from the extreme wings of the society-right and left-for what they are,
hardly descriptions of what is, but competing bids for political change.4" 8
Further value in the political thesis may be seen in its opening our eyes
to political shortcomings in aspects of our constitutional system that can
hardly be laid at the feet of the Court. Take the constitutionally given
external controls on the Court. The correction of Court decisions by con-
stitutional amendment is, practically speaking, a noncontrol.41 9 Con-
gressional control over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the
lower federal courts, is viable. Although Congress has rejected recent
proposals to limit jurisdiction that were designed to penalize the Court
for specific decisions4 20 the power exists when Congress elects to use it.
421
Acknowledgement of the broad and legitimate political role of the Court
in the constitutional system as presently accepted should trigger the
most exacting perusal of nominees for this lifetime career. For this job
description character and professional expertise should. be only the intro-
duction to senatorial interrogation. With rare exceptions422 this interro-
gation has ranged from slim (for nominees with judicial track records) to
none (for nominees hailing from the Senate itself). How often is a nomi-
in the several States," "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," "unreasonable
searches and seizures," "cruel and unusual punishments," etc.
416. Rather, a series of volumes entitled the United States Reports.
417. Cf. U.S. CONST. preamble: ". . .secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity," and Chief Justice Marshall's "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come ..
418. See supra text accompanying notes 23-221 and 404, 409.
419. See sources cited supra note 371.
420. See supra note 395.
421. Charles Black puts particular stress upon the factor of congressional control:
[T]he problem of the power of Congress over the jurisdiction of the federal courts-including
the Supreme Court-I see as absolutely vital. 'Jurisdiction' is the power to decide. If Congress
has wide and deep-going power over the courts' jurisdiction, then the courts'power to decide is a
continuing and visible concession from a democratically formed Congress .... Iwould despair of
defending the judicial power, as we now see and know it, if I believed that the national Congress
had no choice but to let the courts perpetually enjoy such'power as the courts themselves might
hold to be theirs.
C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 18 (1981).
422. Notable exceptions were the confirmation hearing of Justice Brandeis, the second confirma-
tion hearing of Chief Justice Hughes, and, of course, the recent second confirmation hearing of Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
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nee permitted gracefully to turn aside a senatorial question that might
shed light on the nominee's political orientation on crucial issues with "I
cannot comment on an issue that might come before the Court." '423 With
the breadth of political choice that lies before a Justice, the public may
well be entitled to an answer to such questions as "Where do you place
yourself in terms of political or moral philosophy, the use of social sci-
ence data, or even, the 'rights thesis'424 or (forgive me) the 'politics the-
sis?' " Why would it be inappropriate to ask a nominee--especially one
with no political or judicial track record: "What kind of society do you
want this to be? What is the Supreme Court's role in achieving it?"
Finally, a corollary of the politics thesis suggests a crucial, if limited,
educational reform. With eighteen year old citizens voting, there is need
to equip them no later than high school with Specific information on the
true functioning of the Supreme Court as a political institution. A gener-
ation ago it was suggested that law is too important to be left to lawyers,
with the design of inspiring college-level law courses.425 The politics the-
423. The confirmation hearings of the two most recent appointees, Justices O'Connor and Scalia,
were paradigms of senatorial non-interrogation. The confirmation hearing of Chief Justice Rehnquist
is the recent exception to senatorial self-restraint. It should be recalled that two of President Nixon's
designees for the Court, after a heavy senatorial barrage, failed to receive confirmation. See Rees,
Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17
GA. L. REV. 913 (1983). The O'Connor hearings are discussed fully, id. at 918-29. Professor Rees
characterizes the nominee's testimony as "stonewalling of the Judiciary Committee" which he notes,
"posed no obstacle at all to her confirmation." Id. at 922. Professor Laurence Tribe largely concurs
with Rees, and Senator Orrin Hatch entirely disagrees. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE
COURT 40, 92 (1985); Hatch, Save The Court From What?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1347, 1350-53 (1986).
As a member of the Senate, Hatch has recently been mentioned as a prospective Reagan nominee
who would have no trouble being confirmed.
424. The "rights thesis" is Ronald Dworkin's central contribution to contemporary jurispruden-
tial debate. His first step is to distinguish what he calls "arguments of principle" from "arguments of
policy": "Arguments of principle attempt to justify a political decision that benefits some person or
group by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit. Arguments of policy attempt to
justify a decision by showing that, in spite of the fact that those who are benefited do not have a right
to the benefit, providing the benefit will advance a collective goal of the political community." R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 294 (1978). Then, briefly, Dworkin's "rights thesis" pro-
poses that "judicial decisions in civil cases.. characteristically are and should be generated by prin-
ciple not policy." Id. at 84. An entire issue of the Georgia Law Review was given over to critiques of
Dworkin's "rights thesis" by several scholars, and to Dworkin's rebuttals. Jurisprudence Sympo-
sium, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). In MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), Dworkin has included a
selection of his later articles. In LAW's EMPIRE (1986), his latest volume, Dworkin proposes a gen-
eral theory of law, which is just beginning to spark commentary in the academic literature. See, e.g.,
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66-73 (1986). See RONALD
DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE (M. Cohen ed. 1984), in which thirteen academic
lawyers criticize elements of the ample Dworkin corpus, and Dworkin replies copiously.
425. H. BERMAN, ON THE TEACHING OF LAW IN THE LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM
(1956)[hereinafter BERMAN]: "Law, to quote Lord Keynes' paraphrase of Clemenceau, is too impor-
tant a matter to be left to the lawyers." Id. at 28. Clemenceau's comment, made during World War I
while he was prime minister of France, had been that war was too important to be left to the gener-
als. Berman's study was largely a report of a 1954 Harvard Conference on the subject. A 1964
Catholic University conference entitled "Law in the Liberal Arts: the Social Dimension," which
replicated concerns voiced at Harvard, is reported in LAW AND THE LIBERAL ARTS (A. Broderick
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sis underscores that "constitutional law" is a far cry from "just plain
law." We might well leave ordinary law to lawyers, as we leave surgery
to doctors. But the operation of the constitutional aspects of the judicial
system is at least "high civics" and should be made available to all. Will
it be soon, when we are just getting around to the problem of literacy?426
There seems no reason to wait any longer for either. Perhaps former
Chief Justice Burger would stimulate such education as part of his sec-
ond centenary program427 - even if he could not digest the politics
thesis.
ed. 1964). For a summary of the limited subsequent penetration of law into the undergraduate cur-
riculum see Bonsignore, Law School Involvement in Undergraduate Legal Studies, 32 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 53 (1982). Reasons of pre-professionalism, interdisciplinary education, humanism, and pure
apologetics (lessening hostility to lawyers), that were previously advanced, have run out of whatever
steam they ever had. The justification suggested here goes back to Keynes, and to Woodrow Wilson,
who said in 1894 when he was president of Princeton University:
[N]othing will steady us like a body of citizens instructed in the essential nature and processes
of law and a school of lawyers deeply versed in the methods by which the law has grown, the
vital principles by which, under every system, it has been pervaded, its means of serving society
and its means of guiding it. We need laymen who understand the necessity for law, and the right
uses of it too well to be unduly impatient of its restraints .... Law is a branch of political science,
and in this day especially we need to insist in very plain terms upon its study as such....
Wilson, Legal Education of Undergraduates, 17 REP. A.B A. 439 (1894), (cited in BERMAN, supra,
at 159.) In this spirit almost a century later, constitutional law in the making, as high politics,
becomes high civics. And high school students (as well as undergraduates) are entitled to explore it
as basic education for citizenship.
426. "It is estimated that nearly 23 million Americans are functionally illiterate: unable to read
well enough to understand a job application, medicine label or a telephone directory." Mattleman &
Torsella, The Shame--and Costs-of Illiteracy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 17, col. 2. Later in
that month the U.S. Department of Education released a report entitled "Literacy: Profiles of
America's Young Adults," based on a survey of 3,600 young people between twenty-one and twenty-
five. This report put the illiteracy figure at ten million. As James Reston writes, "Either way this is
not merely a problem but a national disgrace that is obviously getting less attention than it de-
serves." Reston, Read It If You Can, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, at 25, col. 5.
427. On June 17, 1986 Chief Justice Burger announced his forthcoming retirement from the
Court, to supervise the second centennial of the Constitution celebration.
69
Broderick: Constitutional Politics: Affirmative Action and Supreme Process
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1987
